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THE LEGAL CONCEPr OF THE TEACHER'S CONTRACT

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

statement of the problem:

The major purpose of this

study is to determine the nature and characteristics of the
oontractual relationships between sohool boards of education
and publio sohool teachers.

Controversies between the board

and the teacher have frequently arisen and have often been
oarried to the courts.

Courts have been called upon to set

tle issues which deal with the status eXisting between the
board and the teaoher, and thereby do exert an influence up
on the privileges or denials, allowed or disallowed when
oontraoting parties make suoh agreements.

This study deals

with the action of the courts, and the deoisions of the judges
as based upon and governed by the facts of the case.
There are some points which are assumed but until test
ed may prove fallacies.

Is a teacher who holds a oertifi

oate really a teacher?

From what do the rights, duties and

liabilities of a teacher arise?

When is a contract legal?

2

How long is the teacher employed under it?
er reoover his salary under it?
if so, on what grounds?

May

Can the teach

he be dismissed, and

What are the statutory and common

law requisites of the teacher's oontract ot employment?
When, and by whom may public school teachers be dismissed?
When may a teacher recover compensation?

What discrepancy

eXists, between educational practices and the legal rules and
procedures in references to dismissal of teachers?
It is important that all persons in the teaching profes
sion who are anxious to perform their function in education
and wish to avoid inharmonious contacts should have an in
terest concerning these issues.
Perhaps the results ot such a study would tend to reduce
the number of controversies arising and would provide tor a
more harmonious attitude between teacher and the party or
parties to whom he is responsible.
Purpose ot the study
This study has been made for the purpose ot:
(1) Discovering these issues pertinent to teacher
contracts, which have been adjUdicated by the
judioial tribunals of the various states.
(2) Correlating and revealing some legal prinoiples
which have been decisive of cases in whi'ch the
issues involved were related to teacher con
tracts, and which might serve as praotioal aids
to those who may be confronted by legal questions

:3

pertaining to teacher contracts.
(3) Attempting to discover trends in the attitude
of the judiciary towards issues pertinent to
teacher contraots.
Souroes of Data.
The repQrts of oases deoided by the Supreme Courts of
the various states and the United States, the National Re
porter Systems of the various states, and the United States
reports, were the ohief' souroes of the study.

A

handbook of

oases l dealing with ruling case law was also used.

Several

textbooks 2 and some research 1nvestigations3 along legal
oases 1n education were also examined for for.m, and organi
zation of the legal data.
Final efforts at classifioation resulted in the follow
ing general headings, whioh have been used as chapter head
iuga:
iRuling Case Law, Vol. XXIV.
2Trusler, Harry Raymond. Essential_s of Sohool Law,
Pp. vi & 1 7 5 . 
Morehart, Grover C., The Legal Status of City Sohool
Boards, Pp. vii & 96.
Maian, Clement T., Indiana Sohool Law and Supreme
Court Deo i sions ,. pp. x & 472.

3Edwards, I. N., "Legal Authority of Boards of Eduoa
tion", Elementary School Journal, XXX (February, 1930),
431-439.

Edwards, I. N., "Marriage as the Legal Cause for Dis
missal of Women Teaohers," Elementary school Journal,
XXV (May, 1925), 692-695.
Anderson, Earl William, The Teacher's Contraot and
Other Legal Phases of Teacher status, Pp. 1 & 8.
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(1) Introduction
(2) The Teacher's Contract
(3) Contractual Powers of the School Board

(4) Removal and Dismissal of Teachers

(5) Contractual Powers of tbe Teacher
The chapter headings are not mutually inclusive in all in
stances but seem to be logical divisions to the author.
Limitations or study
This is not an attempt toclassi fy legislative acts of
the various states with regard to Contractual Powers, Cer
tificate Requirements, Tenure Codes, or Formal ReqUisites of
Teachers' Contracts.

Cubberly and others have written ex

oellent treatises on Certification of Teachers. 4 This study
deals only with those powers of school boards and teachers
as revealed in common law deoisions relative to the teacher's
contract.

The contractual status is a single phase of the

legal status.

The title represents an attempt to delimit

olearly the scope of this investigation.

The term

~teacher"

used in this study refers to the "public school teacher", al
though the legal import of the term, however, is wide enough
to include superintendent, supervisors, principals, and oth
er supervisory officers.
4Cubberly, Ellwood P., "Certification of Teachers~,
N.S.P.E. Fifth Year Book, Pt. II, Pp. 1-88.

CHAPTER II
~HE

Introduetion:

TEACHER'S CONTRACT

It is the contract of employment, strict

ly speaking, which changes the mere holder of a teaoher's cer
titicate into a teacher.

-

It is also the contract which in

vests the teacher with his publio charaeter and establishes a
legal

re~ationship

teacher.

between the board of education and the

It 1s the purpose of the contract to secure a def

inite written statement of an agreement.

This may include

that the teacher will teach in a system for the sucoeeding
year.

It may also be an agreement of certain duties and reg

ulations as to payme,nts for absence, and salary schedule.

The

oontraot may inform the teacher of certain legal rights which
usually oan be gained only, by the board

contractua~ly,

such

as the right to terminate upon definite notice, or to termi
nate for marriage of the teacher.

The contract usually gives

the time and length of serVice and salary.

6

The variety of stipulations found in oontraot forms in
dioates that many oontraotual reservations grow out of diffi
oulties that have arisen between teaohers and sohool boards.
A sruvey of a variety of possible diffioulties shows the fu
tility of attempting to provide for them in the contraot form
itself.
In twenty-three states; Arkansas, Indiana, Idaho, Iowa,
Kansas, Maryland, Massaohusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississip
pi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota t Vermont, Virginia,
West Virginia, and Wisoonsin, there are statutes whioh designate
speoifio items that must appear in the oontraot forms.

The In

diana state form has the largest number of items - forty in num
ber.

Twenty states have no laws stipulating What must be in

the oontraot.
In a study of oontraot f'orms made by E. W. AnderSon,l whioh

study oonsisted of colleoting forms in cities f'rom 10,000 and up
to 100,000 f'rom 50 per oent of his forms f'rom oities of 100,000
or over, he has tabulated fifty-eight speoific duties of' the
teacher.

He comments thus:

In the main these reter to duties usually expected of the
teaoher. Duties outside of school, including restrictions,
refer to outside of sohool work at other oallings, residence
in the district, visitation of homes, attendanoe at summer
sohools, enrollment in extension classes, abstinence from danc
ing and from social activities on school nights, and from tu
toring pupils. Only one case of each of the three last re
striotions oocurred in the contracts studied.
'I

lAnderson, Earl W1lligm, The Teacher's Contract and other
Legal Phases of Teacher status, pp. 1 & 8.
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In the same study the author points out that between 1907
and 1916 a study of the cases of teacher-board litigation shows
that 22 per oent or the cases might have been avoided by the
wording or the contract.
Since the contract is an agreement that the teacher is
to

1~truct

under the supervision of the board of education,

the teacher holds his position by virtue or suoh an agreement.
The teacher

contrao~

ual relationship.

does not

d1~fer

from any other oontract

It may, therefore, be judged by the same

oriteria as any other oontraot.
The common law has established a series of requisites
oommon to all simple contracts and, except when controlled by
statute the making and execution of contracts with teachers
in the public sohools are governed by the rules and principles
relating to simple contraots in general. 2 The "common law"
requisites make up one division of essentials and the "statu
tory requisites", giving those prescribed by statute, such as
requiring contract to be 1n writing, to be filed with the clerk,
and other requisites, make up the second division of essential
requisites of teacher oontracts.
Williston 3 in his treatise on Contracts, states that the
requirements for the formation of a simple contract are:
(1) Parties of legal capacity; (2) An expression of

mutual assent of the parties to a promise or set of promises;
(3) An agreed valid consideration.

The agreement must also not

2cyclopedia of Law and Procedure 1081.
3Williston, E. W., Contracts, Vol. I, pp. 17-18.
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be declared void by statute or oammon law.
As

these requisites are common to all simple oontracts

it will suffice our purpose to illustrate the applioation of
them in a few typioal teaoher oontraots.

Thus, a vote of the

board of eduoation of a oity in favor of employing a oertain
person as teaoher does not oonstitute a oontraot with suoh a
person, where the board immediately after the balloting rtthen
and there" refuses to deolare said person eleoted.

The oourt

sa1d:
Employment implies a oontraot on the part of the employ
er to hire and on the part of the employee to perform serv
ioes; and until suoh oontraot is mutually entered into it oan
have no binding obligation on either party.4
Again, a oontraot between sohool direotors and a teaoher
to pay good wages laoks definiteness as to oonsiderationand
would, therefore, be too indefinite to found aotion upon.

In

an early Indiana oase, where it was assumed that no statute
required the oontraot of the teaoher to be in writing, a teaoh
er entered into a verbal agreement with a trustee, who agreed
to pay her rtgood wages" to teaoh the ensuing term of sohool.
In a suit for damages brought by the teaoher against the dis
trioton aooount of its refusal to allow her to teaoh, it was
held that beoause of indefiniteness no oontraot had been
formed.

"It is neoessary -for the information of the oitizens,"

said the oourt, "that oontraots made with teaohers should be
oertain and definite in their terms; otherwise the oitizens
oannot guard their interests, nor observe the oonduot of their
4Mallol v. Board of Eduoation, 102 Cal. 642.

9

ottioers. n5
Fraudulent representation that a teacher was not mar
ried and would remain unmarried, made in order to seoure a
oontraot to teaoh, would be an illustration of an agreement
to be deolared void by the oammon law. 6
It is essential to the validity of a teaoher contraot
that it oomply with all the for.mal requisites prescribed by
the statutes controlling

i~.

Suoh requisites will vary with

in different jurisdiotions and no general rule oan be laid
down.

The following statutory requisites, however, are among

the most· important ones noted, viz:

oontraot to be in writ

ten form; to be signed by proper board offioers; to be signed
by the parties to the oontraot; time and plaoe of teaohing to
be speoified; mnount ot wages to be paid, and other agree
ments.
Teaohers enter into contraots with boards ot sohool oon
trol in

wh1~1s vested

the authority to oontraot for teaohing

servioes within a publio sohool distriot.

The outstanding

essential of a board's authority to oontraot With a teaoher
11es in unitary or oorporate aotion.

Individual members of

a board of sohool control have no authority as indiVidual mem
bers to oontraot with teaohers.

Their authority as members

lies in their aotivity as a board and not as individual mem
bers of a board.

For this reason boards may repudiate what

OFairplay Sohool Township v. O'Neal, 127 Ind. 95; 27 Ind.
App. 65.
6Guilford Sohool Townshi~ v. Roberts, 62 N.E. 711.

individual members do.
Thus, where board members agree in their individual
oapacity to employ a certain teacher and, sUbsequently, in
a board meeting repudiate their individual agreements, the
teacher has no redress as the agreement is held to be void
on the ground of pUblic policy.?

The teacher's contraot of

employment is a corporate contract and the statutes usually
stipulate the manner of its authorization. 8

Thus it was held

that in the selection or a teaoher the statutes required the
teaoher to be selected by the school board, and that a con
tract between the president and secretary of the board with
out the ooncurrence of the board was invalid, and could not
be enforced.

In such instance the court said:

This statute is a valuable one, intended to compel the
expression of each individual member or the school board on
the subject all important in public education, and this for
the very purpose or preventing jobbery, and the exercise of
one-man power in the conduct or our oommon schools.9
By

virtue of tbe corporate oharacter of the board's

authority, it follows that a board of sohool control must
convene as a board in order to enter into a valid contract
of employment wi th a te,aoher.

Regarding the employment of

teaohers, the rule is generally stated that a oontract With
a teacher must be agreed upon at a convened meeting of the
?McCortle v. Bates, 29 Ohio st. 419; McGinn v. Willer,
t) Cal. App. 111.
8nennison Township v. Padden, 89 Fa. st. 395; Graham
v. school District, 33 Ore. 263; McNolty v. Board or Educa
tion, 102 wis. 261; Malloy v. Boara of Education, 102 Cal.

'642:"

9nennison TOwnship v. padden, 89 Pa. st. 395.
===
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board of school control of whioh all members had due notice
and an opportunity to be present. 10 This rule is supported
by the overwhelming weight 01' author1 ty J and the oases nega
tiving the necessity of a formal meeting of the board for the
valid employment of a teacher are limited. ll
Short excerpts from leading decisions here follow to in
dicate the principle upon which necessity, notice, and oppor
tunity of meeting are predicated.
It is an elementary principle of law that when several
persons are authorized to do an act 01' a public nature, which
requires deliberation, they all should be conven~d because
the advice and opinion 01' all may be usetul, though all do
not unite in the opinion. (Alman v. School Distri,ct. )10
The determination of the members individually 1s not the
determination of the board. A board must act as a unit and
in the manner prescribed •••• The statute does not vest the
powers of the district in three persons .but in a single board
called the district board. (Harrington v. District Township
ot Liston.)lO
The public selects each member of the board of direct
ors and is entitled to his service. This it can not enjoy,
i~ two members can bind it without receiving or even sutter
ing the counsel 01' the other. Two could, if they differed
with the third, overrule his jUdgment and aot without regard
ing it, but he might by his knowledge and reason change the
bent of their minds, and the opportunity must be given him•
••• No contract oan be made except at a meeting, and no meet
ing oan be held unless all are present or unless the absent
member had notice. (School District v. Bennett.)lO

lOA1kman v. sohool District, 27 Kan. 129; Armstrong v.
School Distriot, reO Ill. App. 430; Barton v. School District,
77 Ore. 50, Ann. Cas. 19l7A 252; Ballard v. Davis, 31 MIss.
533; Casto v. Board 01' Education, 38 W. va. 707; Harrington
'"I. Liston, 47 Iowa 11; ~yan v. Humt~ri;2' 50 Okla. 343, L.R.A.
1915 F 1047; School Dis. v. Benne,
Ark. 511; Wintz v.
Board of Education, 28 W. Va. 227. 
I1Hermance v. Publio School Distriot, 20 Ariz. 314;
MontsQmer! v. state, 35 Neb. 655; Russell v. state, 13 Neb.
68; Schoo District v. stone, 14 Colo. App. 211; state 01'
Indiana v. Vanosdol, 15 L. R. A. 832 (Ind.); Weatnerby v.
city of Chattanooga, Tennessee Ct. App. 1898.

12
An

interesting question is raised as to whether boards

of school control, exercising the wide discretion of appoint
ive power. may delegate their authority to enter into con
tract with teachers, to individual board members, or board
o~ficers

schools.

such as secretary, clerk, and superintendent of
Obviously, an agreement among school directors to

parcel out among themselves the control of the district
sohools. delegating to each authority to engage a teacher
for a particular sohool. is void. 12 Moreover, the law un
doubtedly holds that while boards may delegate to the super
intendent of schools the power of seleoting teachers, the
power to authorize the appointment of teaohers cannot be del
egated, suoh power having been specifioally oonferred upon
boards by statutes.
d~legari

applies.

The maxtm delegata potestas non £?test
The power to appoint is vested solely in

the board of school control.

Such power requires judgment

on the part of school direotors and therefore cannot be del
egated.

Excerpts from leading deoisions establish this prin

ciple of law.
This power of appointment requi~es an exercise of jUdg
ment and oould not be delegated to the secretary or anybody
else•••• Parties dealing with a municipal corporation are bound
to know the extent of the power lawfully confided to the of
ficers with whom they are dealing in behalf of such corpora
tion and they must guide their conduct accordingly.13
The plaintiff had no right to rely upon the action of
the superintendent as a basis of service in the oapacity of
teacher so as to become ultimately one of the permanently em
ployed teachers. A knowledge of the law is imputed to her.
l~tchell v. Williams, 46 S. W. 325.

l3Coleman v. Distriot of Columbia, 279 Fed. 990.
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There is no suoh th1ng as apparent soope of authority in one
professing to aot as an agent for a public munioipality of
which the power and manner of exercise are so strictly and
minutely defined by statute •••• If one oontracts with another
professing to aot as agent of the distriot it is at the peril
of the oontraoting party. 14
It does not follow, however, from the above-quoted auth
ority, that a superintendent of sohools may not be delegated
the authority to oontraot with a partioular teaoher.

That

would not be the delegation of the speoifio authority to oon
traot with teachers but rather an authorization to oontraot in
a particular instanoe.

Thus in Denison v. Inhabitants of Vinal

Haven the court says:
It appears by the evidenoe that it was customary in that
town for the superintendent to hire the teaohers. The school
oommdttee could not delegate this authority to any other per
son or persons in the sense of relieving the~elves from re
sponsibility, but there oan be no question that the superin
tendent of sohools could employ teaohers at their request. 15
In oase the superintendent of s'ohools employs teaohers with
out any authorization of the board, as is often done in prao
tice, then the validity of the contraot made with the teaoh
er depends upon sUbsequent rat'ification by the board in whom
the appointive power rests.
Statutes qUite generally make invalid a teacher contraot
in which a board member holds or may hold a pecuniary inter
est.

Thus a oontract with a near relative of a board member

is held invalid. 16

The provisions of suoh statutes, however,

14Tagsart v. School District, 96 Oregon, 422, 188 Pac.
908.
15Denison v. Inhabitants of Vinal Haven, 100 Me. 136.
16Nuokols v. Lyle, 8 Ida. 589, 70 Pao. 401.
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do not apply to relatives not speoified within the statutes. 17
The authority to oontract with teachers

imp~ies

the power

to agree upon compensation,18 and it is immaterial that the
oompensation fixed for the teacher exoeeds the estimate or
needs previously deter.mined for the separate sohools.19

The

authority to oontraot with teaohers oarries with 1t the ab
solute r1ght to decline to employ or reemploy an applicant
for the position or teaoher for any or no reason,20 nor will
mandamus lie to oompel such employment by the board. 21
In the absenoe of statutory provisions to the oontrary,
oral oontracts with teachers are valid. 22

There is no law of

oontracts making it inherently necessary to place a teacher's
oontraot in writing.

It is true, that most jurisdictions pro

vide by statutes, that boards of school control are empower
ed to contract w1th teachers, to enter into written oontracts,
and to file the same with the clerk.

A good statement as to

the doctr1ile of validity of oral oontraots e'ntered into with
te·aohers is found in Pearson v. School Dis.trj,ct. 23

It sh.ould

be observed in this case that the two jUdges Who dissented
trom the majori ty opinion d1d so on the ground t hat the par...
tictilar statute did require contracts with teachers to be

17Board

01' Education v. Beal, 135 N.E. 540.
18Deoatur v.- Auditor of CIti" of Peabody, 146 N. E. 360.
l~sams v. Board Of Commissioners, 72 Okla. 84.
20FeO;ple v. City 01' Chicago, 278 Ill. 318, L.R.A. 1917.
21Malloy v. Board of Education, 102 Cal. 642.
22Griggs v. School District, 87 Ark. 93; Jameson v. Board
or Education; 74 W. Va. 389; Jaokson school Township v. Shere,
e Ind. App. 330; Roberts v. Clay City, 102 Ky. 68.
~
23Pearson v. School Distriot, 144 Wis. 620.
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reduoed to writing.

They disagreed with the majority of the

court in regard to the interpretation of the statute.

They

did not, however, dissent from the dootrine of the validity
of oral oontracts in absenoe of statutory requirements.

The

gist of the majority opinion in this oase follows:
•••• But the statute does not say that the contraot must
be in writing, and the oourt oannot read into the statute pro
visions not found here for the purpose of rendering an oral
oontraot, otherwise unobjeotionable, void beoause not in writ
ing, in the absenoe of express statutory requirement. An
oral oontraot by a school teaoher with a munioipality or sohool
distriot is valid, in the absenoe of requirement that it be in
writing ••.• The provision relied upon by applioant is, at best,
only direotory •••• It is a detail respeoting the keeping of a
reoord, and not a limitation upon the power to make an oral
oontraot. If the Legislature intended that suoh a oontraot
should be void if not in writing, it would have so deolared •
•••• Here the board did meet and vote to hire the plaintiff,
who was a qualified teacher, holding a diploma or oertifioate,
and speoified the wages to be paid and the term of servioe.
The plaintiff aooepted the terms, and assented to the propo
sition of the defendant. This oonstituted a good oontraot at
oowaon law. It needs no oitation of authority to the point
that statutes in derogation of the oo~on law must be striot
ly oonstrued.
It is generally held that a parol oontraot, to avoid the
defeot of indefiniteness, must be reoorded in the minutes of
the sohool board and the minutes duly

aoo~pted.

Suoh aocept

ance of the minutes indioates the aooeptanoe of the parol oon
traot. 24

The oase of Pollard v. Sohool Distriot,25 however,

is authority to the oontrary on this partioular point.
Where the statutes require that the teaoher's oontraot
be reduoed to wr1tten form, and that no aotion shall be brought
upon any oontraot not made in oonformity with suoh provision,
24Costello v. sohool Distriot, 241 Pa. st. 179.
25Pollard v. Sohool District, 65 Ill. App. 104.

16
there can be no reoovery by the teacher either upon the oral
agreement or upon a quantum meruit.

In many jurisdictions,

it is expressly required that a contraot with a teaoher shall
be in WTiting,26 and failure so to conform makes the oral
oontract with the teaoher unenforoeable at law. 27

Nor oould

a teacher reoover on suoh an oral contraot under a quantum
meruit, notwithstanding the services were neoessary. acoept
able, and beneficial to the school oorporation. 28

Moreover,

a teaoher oannot rely on a superintendent's authority to hire
orally as the teaoher is presumed to know the law. 29
Where a teacher has been regularly elected by a board
of school control, it is the duty of the chairman and secre
.tary of the board subsequently to enter into the written con
traot with the teacher. 30

It has been observed that it is

not neoessary that the written contraot be executed at the
same time and
oontrol.

place~by

the members of the board ot school

Although filing and attestation of the oontraot by

the clerk may be speoified as a statutory requirement, it
has been held that the failure so to do oannot prejudioe the

t,

26Faulk v~ Mccourtne
42 Kan. 69,5; Gr;i.sss v. School
Distriot, 87 Ark. 93; Gra am v. SohoQl Distriot, 33 Ore. 263;
Hutchins v. Colfax TownshIp, 128 Mich. 177; Lewis v. Hayden,
18 Ky. L.R. 980; Leland v. St. Louis Co., 77 Minn. 469; Lee
v. York School TownshiP. 163 Ind. 339; Wetmore v. st. loUIS
Board of Education, 86 Mo. App. 362.
27City School Co~oratlon v. Hiokman, 47 Ind. App. 500;
Hutchins v. Colfax Township, 128 MIch. 177.
28Lee v. York School Township, 163 Ind. 339.
29Taggart v. Soh. Dist., 96" Or. 422,188 Pac. 908.
30Davison v. Harrison, 140 Ky. 520.
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teaoher,
er. 31

~or

suoh aots are not within oontrol

o~

the teaoh

Suoh aots are held to be direotory rather than manda

tory.
Notwithstanding the rigid requirements of statutes 1n
re~erenoe

to contractual requisites already oonsidered, the

oourts will

o~ten ~ind

a substantial oomplianoe with the

statutory formalities and thus maintain the validity of the
teaoher's oontraot.
Thus, where a contraot was signed by a teaoher and trus
tee with the time for length of servioe left blank until it
oould be asoertained, the validity of the oontraot was not
tmpaired. 32

Again, a teaoher's contraot was not held void

where the teaoher's oertifioate did not aooompany it. 33

Fail

ure of direotors to sign full name,34 or to sign the oon
traot,35 was held not to invalidate the oontraot where other
requisites were sUbstantially complied with.

Again, it has

been held that lack of formality in reoording board minutes
would not invalidate a teacher's contraot. 36 Failure to ex
eoute duplicate oontraots has been held not to impair the
validity,37 and where a teacher made a oontraot signed by a
.

31McShone v. Sohool_District, 70 Mo. App. 124.
32Atkins v. Van Buren School Township, 77 Ind. 447.
33State v. Board of Eduoation, 95 W. Va. 57.
34RY~ v. Sohool Distriot, 27 Minn~ 433; Langston v.
Sohool Dis riot.
35Farrell v. Sohool Distriot, 98.Mioh. 43.
36Cluene v. Sohool District, 166 Wis. 452.
(
37~ v. School District, 107 Ark. 305.
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director who was at the same time president of the board it
was not invalidated by reason of failure of the president to
approve and file with the board.

Here, as in previous oases

cited, there was substantial oompliance with the statutory
requirements. 58
If, through a mutual mistake, the writing fails to
press the oontraot in

anr

ex~

material partioular, it may be re

formed by a oourt of equity; for example, the signature of
a oontraot by "0. M. Lloyd, township trustee", may be oharged
in eqUity to "0. M. Lloyd, sohool trustee" where under a state
law a township trustee has no authority to employ a teacher. 39
It appears in an Indiana ease that a certain Miss Taylor
applied to a school board for a position.
board contained the following:

The reoord of the

W;Moved and seconded that the

following teaoher,s be employed for the ensuing year:
Dean, Coats, Riggins, and Taylor - carried."

Misses

Later, however,

the trustees repudiated this alleged oontract with Miss
Taylor, who then brought suit for damages.

The court allowed

the letter of applioation and the resolution or the trustees
to be considered together as the written terms of the oon
tract.

The omission of Miss Taylor t s Christian name, was not

regarded as a material objeotion to the oontract, as her
identi ty could be established by parol evidenoe.

But the

38Berison v~ Township Silver Lake, 100 Iowa 328.
39s parta ~ch.
v. Mendall, 138 In~. 188, 37 N. E.
604.

m.
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alleged contract was held unenforceable on account of indef
1niteness.

Taken together the application and the order of

the board, as the court pointed out:
The contraot does not state when the sohools in the town
of Petersburg began in the year 1901 - neither the day nor
the month - or the grade appellant was to teach. or the pay
she was to reoeive. It cannot be claimed that they are def
inite in these essentials to a complete contract. Where a
statute prescribes a mode of exeroising a power, that mode
must be adopted. Persons contracting with school trustees are
bound to take notice that their powers are limited by law. 40
However. the mere failure of the contract to state when
the teacher's services are to begin or end does not render
it unenforceable on aoeount of indefiniteness, since the law
will imply, "That the servioes are to be rendered Within the
sohool year and are to begin when the school board fixes the
opening of the term.,,41
It should be

note~ tha~

the mere vote of a school board

in favor of employing a oertain person as teaoher does not
constitute a contract of employment with such person.

As

the supreme Court of California has deolared:
The ballots were only 'an expression or cboioe on the
part of the members casting them, and had no greater force
or effeot than an oral vote would have had. At most they
amounted only to an offer of employment, which respondent
had a right to refuse and the board had a right to revoke
or cancel at any time before acoeptanoe. 42
40Taylor v. School Town of Petersburgh, 33 Ind. App.
675, 72 N~ E. 159.
41BUtcher v. Charles, et. al., 95 Tenn. 532, 32 S. W.
631; Com. of Seotion sixteen v. Criswell, 6 Ala. 585; Crabb
v. Sch. D~st., 93 Mo. App. 254; Denison v. Inhabitants of
Vinal Haven, 100 Me. 136, 60 Atl. 798.
42MallOY v. Board of Eduoation, 102 Cal. 642, 36 Pac.
948.
-~ z
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Of course if the teacher, in a letter of application
had previously offered to teach, the board's vote would be
an aoceptanoe of that offer.

If the teacher is oareful to

make his application in writing deta1led and definite, an
acoeptanoe of it will form a oontract unobjeotionable from
the standpoint of certainty.

In such oases it is not nec

essary to a completed contraot that the board notify the
teacher of his election or that he notify it of his accept
ance. 43

It follows from the above principles that where a

teacher has been regularly employed by a school board, a
refusal of the president to sign the contract, as required
by the statute, does not affeot the validity of the contract. 44
Manifestly, a valid oontraot must be mutual, certain,
definite, and free from fraud and illegality, and must be
legally authorized and exeouted and meet all the necessary
requisites, both of the oommon law and the statutes.
43weatherly v. Mayor, eto., of Chattanooga, Tenn.; 48

S. W. 136.-



44School Dist. v. Edmonston, 50 Mo. App. 65.

CHAPrER ITt
CONTRACTUAL POWERS OF THE SCHOOL BOARD

One objeot

o~

this study is to determine the answer

to such questions as the following:
appoint the teachers?

Who shall seleot and

How are the limitations upon the

appointive power determined and by whom?
ary powers do they possess?

What discretion

May such boards impose addi

tional rules and regulations upon qualified candidates?
If a teaoher must enter into a oontraotual status in
order to enter upon professional duties the question im
mediately presses with whom must he contract.

In the ear

ly colonial days the people in town meetings voted to es
tablish and support a school, and then voted to seleot the
schGol master for it.

Here the people hired the teacher.

As schools grew and increased in size and importance, a

distinction between lay and professional funotions in school
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control was gradually differentiated.

The hiring of teach

ers was one of the first professional funotions to be sub
tracted from the people and assigned to a special group.
These groups were reoognized by

legis~atures

and invested

with statutory powers, chiet among which was the power to
contract with the teaohers.
The powers of the sohool oommittee as they were later
designated, are presoribed and lim1 ted by statute, and al
so by suoh provisions of the oonstitution of the state as
are self-enforoing.

In

~

v.

sc~ool D~strict

the

famil~

tar doctrine is olearly stated that a person entering into
a contract for a school through its direotors must at his
peril take notioe of the limited powers of the directors,
and if he enters into a contraot with them in excess of
their powers, no recovery thereon oan be had. l
The doctrine that eduoation is a funotion of the state
is well established in American Law.

The state may vest

here authority in a state board of education, or distribute
it to county, township or city organization throughout its
territory.2

That the state should maintain control of the

oertifioation of teaohers, and not release this power to
loo~

organizations was well illustrated in the Board of

Eduoation of Galesburg v. Arnold. 3

In this oase t~e gen~ral

lRudy v. School Distriot, 82 Iowa 682.
2Q.Q..!7 v. Carter, 148 Ind. 467; Gunnison v. BOard of
EducatIOn; 176 N. Y. 13; Kennedl v. MIller, 97 Cal. 429;
State v. Haworth, 122 Ind. 458.
3Board ot Eduoation of Galesburg v. Arnold, 121 Ill. 11.
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sohool law provided that:
No teaoher shall be entitled to any portion of the
sohoolor township rund ••• who shall not at the time of
his employment have a oertifioation of qualifioation ob
tained under provision of this aot.
It was urged that this general law had no applioation
to Galesburg, as it existed under a speoial aot Whioh pro
vided:
The pUblic sohools of said district shall be under ex
olusive management and oontrol of the board of education••••
It was olaimed that the speoial act gave Galesburg
management over the power to appoint teaohers, that, there
fore, it was an imp11ed power of the Galesburg board to de
termine qualifioations of teaohers irrespeotive of the stat
ute.

The court deolared, and defined the word "management"

thus:
Management of the common sohools •••• relates to the oon
duot of the sohool in imparting instruotion. The power to
employ teaohers may have suffioient scope when limited to
qualified teaohers under the law, •••• they are not given
the right to examine and pass upon qualifications as this
power resides in the oounty superintendent.
·Have the school authorities invested with the power

ot employing teachers unlimited discretion as to the

qual~

ifications of those qualified under the law, which they em
ploy?

The general view appears to be in the affirmative.

Thus it is said:
The board has the absolute right to deoline to employ
or to re-employ any applicant for any reason whatever or 
for no reason at all. It is immaterial whether the ~ppli
oant is married or unmarried, is Of fair oomplexion or dark,
is or is not a member ot a trades union, or whether no
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reason is given for suoh refusal. 4
Two judges in the same oase dissent tram this language,
saying:
A rule oan easily be imagined the adoption of whioh
would be unreasonable, contrary to public policy, and on
the faoe of it not calculated to promote the best interests
and welfare of the sohools. In our opinion, courts would
have the power, in the interests of the publio good, to
prohibit the enforcement of such an arbitrary rule.
The question is important, because teaohers may desire
permanent tenure, or may have made contribution to pension
funds.

It there is no restriction on this power, trustees

may Virtually dictate the domestic, social, political, and
industrial affiliations of teachers.

Especially is this

true if, as has been held, a teaoher may validly agree not
to do for a limited period what he has a legal right to do. 5
The question arises, may school boards impose addi
tional reqUirements, such as mental tests, examinations,
residence, and experienoe?

Perhaps this dootrine is best

stated by the Illinois Supreme Court in the following terms:
It may be oonceded that boards of education
er to pass rules and regulations governing their
torce and that generally such mattexs are within
olusive disoretion, but the boards have no power
an unreasonable rule in violation o·f the statute
stitution. 6
.

have pow
teaohing
their ex
to pass
or oon

Local boards retain the power to determine the pro
fessional status of the teachers they employ and may add
4P~ple e~re~. Fursman v. City ot Chicago, 278 Ill.

318, 116 N. E. 158.
5Guilford Sohool Tp. v. Roberts, 28 Ind. App. 355, 62

N. E. 711.

6peoEle v. Harrison, 223 Ill. 540.
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to the eligibility requirements of the state, provided
such additional requirements are reasonable and not in
lieu of or in conflict With, the laws of the state.?
Thus the right of a local board to require a teach
er to pass an examination prescribed by the local exam
ining committee in addition to the possession of a statu
tory oertificate is upheld by the Appellate Court of Mis
souri:
It must be admitted that in the interest of a higher
educational qualification the defendant Qoard of directors
had the right, in addition to having a statutory oertif
ioate to require her to take an examination in which she
should maintain a oertain standard of fitness, as a teach
er. 8
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and regulations of a more personal and local character than
those usually implied under the term "professional require
ments"?

May local boards impose upon the applicant sex lim

itations, religious qualifications, restriction upon resi
dence or labor affiliations?
The answer will depend upon the courtts interpretation
of the discretionary power of school boards to select and
appoint teachers.
This wide disoretionary power is best stated in the de
cision 0'1' the oourt in Yoeman v. Boardo,f 'Education:
The statutes vest boards of education with power to
appoint teachers for their sChools, and in the exeroise of
this power· they cannot be interfered with by the courts un-ll
less there is gross abuse of the discretionary power given.
The discretionary power with regard to sex, is illus·
trated in the case of Commonwealth ex rel., Scott v. Board
of Eduoation.

A sub-district board within the oity of

Philadelphia had elected a oertain female teacher as prin
oipal of a mixed grammar sohool. 12 The board of education
notified the district board that the appointee was inelig
ible for the position, citing their rules and regulations
that "male teachers only shall be eligible for principal
ship of a grammar school for boys or a mixed grammar
school."

The district board urged that the eleotion of

the teacher by a distriot board was not subjeot to confir
l1Yoeman v. Board of Eduoation, 13 Ohio C. C. 207.
l2c;mmonwealth ex rel. Soott v. Board of Eduoation,
187 Pa. st. 70;-40 Atl. 806.
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mation of the board of publio eduoation and also urged
that the disorimination against their appointee was oon
trary to a oonstitutional guarantee of the state that:
A woman twenty-one years of age and upwards shall be
eligible to any offioe of oontrol and management under
the sahool laws of the state.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in this oase held that
the Board of Publio Eduoation of Philadelphia had the
right to presoribe the qualifioations of teaohers, and in
determining suoh qualifioations for difrerent kinds

or

sohools the board may take into aooount the question ot
sex, and may determine that male teaohers only may be prin
oipals ot oertain olasses of sohools.

In so doing the board

does not violate the oonstitutional guarantee beoause the
ottioe of teaoher is not one of "oontrol and management".
Teaohers are rather offioers of instruotion, and were not
oontemplated in the oonstitutional guarantee in oontrover
sy.
In another Pennsylvania case the disoretion of the
board in referenoe to sex is deolared. 13 In this oase the
board of eduoation refused to oertify a oertain woman as
supervising prinoipal of a grammar sohool on the ground
that she had not had the required experienoe

as presoribed

1n their rules and regulations, and further, that in the
opinion of the board a man prinoipal was needed in the
school.

Again, the oonstitutional provision of the state

13Commonwealth v. Jenks, 154 Pa. st. 368.
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guaranteeing no discrimination against women holding an ot
tice ot oontrol and management under the school laws of the
state was relied upon to deteat the retusal of the board
of eduoation to appoint a woman to the ottioe of supervis
ing prinoipal.

The court in this oase went even further

than in the preceding case, in upholding the disoretion
ot the board in referenoe to sex.

The following prinoiple

was given:
If it be oonceded that the ottice of supervising prin
oipal is an ottice ot oontrol and management, within the
meaning ot the oonstitutional provision •••• her eligibili
ty does not take away or limit the disoretionary power of
the board in determining who should be appointed •••• We do
not see that sex is an important issue in the determina
tion ot this case. No woman should be exoluded trom any
position she is competent to till beoause ot her sex ••••
no woman qualitied for supervising prinoipal should be re
tused an appointment beoause of her sex alone. The ques
tion of eligibility is one thing. The selection among a
olass of eligibles is qUite another. Sex ought not to af
teet the tirst, it may help under some circumstances to
determine the last.
The rules given for qualifioations tor a supervising
prinoipal oame within the oontrol ot the board ot eduoa
tion.

They were reasonable rules and the board would not

i~e~e~.

Tbe religious belief of teaohers, or laok ot it, does
not act as a restriction upon the exeroise of the wide
disoretionary power of school direotors in their power of
seleotion and appointment.

On

~his poin~

the Illinois

Supreme Court says:
The statute has not prescribed any religious beliet
as a qualification for a teacher in the public schools.

.
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The sohool authorities may seleot a teacher who belongs
to any ohurch or no ohuroh as they may think best.14
Again, in Hysons v. School Distriot the Supreme court
of Pennsylvania deolares:
Unquestionably these women are Catholios •••• believ
ing fully in the distinctive oreed and dootrine of Cath
olioism. But this does not disqualify them. our Con
stitution negatives any assertion Of inoapaoity or in
eligibility to offioe beoause of religious belief••••
If by law, any man or woman can be excluded from publio
offioe of employment because he or she is a Catholic that
is a palpable violation of the spirit of the Constitution
•••• Men may disqualify themselves by crime, but the state
no longer disqualifies beoause of religious be11ef.15
A nice question as to the discretion of the board of
education is raised in the so-called religious garb cases.
There are two suoh outstanding cases, one in New York and
one in Pennsylvania.

The faots of eaoh are praotioally on

all fours, but opposite deoisions are reaohed in eaoh jur
isdiction by the oourts of highest resort.

In the Penn

sylvania oase the faots are essentially as follows. 15

Two

sisters of the order of st. Joseph held regular certifi
oates granted them in their religious names.

A oontraot

to teaoh in the publio sohools of Gallitzan Borough was
issued to eaoh of these sisters in their religious names
by the Board of Eduoation of Gallitzan.

While teaohing

in the publio schools they wore at all t !mes the familiar
and distinctive garb of the order together with cruoifixes
14Millard v. Board of Education, 121 Ill. 297, 10

N. E. 669.
15Hzson v. School District of Gallitzon, 164 Pa. st.
629, 30 Atl. 482.
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and rosaries of the order and seot.

There was no evidence

that they used the garb or insignia to attract particular
attent ion to themselves, or endeavored to use them to im
part religious or sectarian instruction.

They were re

quired by their vows to the church to wear such garb and
such insignia.

Children in the school addressed these

teachers as Sisters.

The evidence showed that the Board

of Sohool Directors of Gallitzan Borough intended to employ
none but Catholio Sisters in oertain rooms.

It also ap

peared in evidence that certain religious instruction· and
exeroises of the Catholic church preoeded and followed the
opening and closing of the public school session.

Protestant

children were not required to attend or participate in these
exercises or instruction:

The question at issue was:

Did

the instruction in the school become sectarian under the con
ditions herein enumerated?

The oourt held that it was not

oalled upon to determine whether the direotors acted wise
ly or not, but to determine under the law whether sec
tarian instruotion had actually been given or was liable
to be given in the public schools.

The policy of the di

rectors of Gallitzan in discriminating in favor of persons
belonging to a particular class might indicate a repre
hensible indifferenoe on the part of the directors to the
polioy of the law to divorce all matters tending to seo
tarianism from the pUblio schools.

The court, however,
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round it to be the policy of the school law of the state
which lodges in boards discretionary powers to employ teach
ers J not to interfere in the exeroise of that power unless
it be arbitrarily exercised to the detriment of the school.
This discretion, when it does not transgress the law, is
not revi'ewable by the oourts.

Referring to the finding of

faot upon whioh the decision turned J Justioe Dean said:
The dress is but an announcement of the fact that the
wearer holds a particular belief •••• Are the courts to de
cide that the out of a man's coat or the color of a woman's
gown is sectarian teaching because they indicate a seotar
ian religious belief?
The dissenting judge in this oase, however, reached an op
posite conclusion in reference to the facts.

Justice

Williams said:
They (Sisters) have oeased to be civilian or seoular
persons. They have become eoolesiastical persons known by
religious names and devoted to relig10us work •••• The ques~
tion presented on this state of facts is whether a school
that is filled with religious or eoclesiastical persons as
teachers •••• wearing their eoclesiastical robe and hung
about with the rosaries and other devices peculiar to their
ohurch and order is not necessarily dominated by sectarian
influence and obnoxious to the spirit of the constitution
al provisions and school laws.
In the New York case referred tO J the state superinten
dent of public instruction had direoted that teachers wear
ing the garb peculiar to a religious order shall not be em
ployed by a trustee of a school district or J ir employed,
shall be dismissed unless the wearing of the garb is discon
tinued.

The court states, the question to be deoided is

whether the disoretion of the state superintendent ooncerning
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the wearing of a religious garb was a reasonable exercise
thereof or not.

The court held that the same rule of law

was applicable to the state superintendent's discretion
as was applicable to the school directors' discretion, and
cites the case of Ra~linson v. Post as an authority in
point. 16 In that oase the court points out that the sohool
directors have power to classify scholars; to regulate
their studies and their department; but that all such rules
and regulations must be reasonable and oalculated to pro
mote the objeots of the law.

The court then addressed it

self to the question of faot.

Is it unreasonable to pro

hibit the wearing of a religious garb in the public school?
The court found that it was not.

The opinion of the dis

senting jUdge in the Pennsylvania case. was cited with ap
proval. and in agreement with bim the court held that the
wearing of a religious garb by a teacher within a public
school may constitute sectarian influeance of the type pro
hibited by law and public policy.

The outstanding agree

ment in these two opposite decisions is the declaratton of
the doctrine that boards of education have wide discretion
in the seleotion and appointment ot teachers in the pUblic
schools.

The point ot departure is on the interpretation

of the facts; one court holds that the wearing of a relig
ious garb was seotarian influence. and the other oourt holds
that it was not.
I6Rawlinson v. ~, 7~ Ill. 567.
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The question has been adjudicated in two states as
to whether a board of eduoation may refuse appointment or
reappointment to teachers affiliated with labor organizations.
Like the preoeding questions of discretion in referenoe to
sex, religion, and religious garb, this is

pl~inly

one of

reasonableness of the discretionary power to be exeroised
by boards of eduoation.

In Frederick v. Owen, the resolu

-

tions of the board treated affiliation with labor unions
as eqUivalent to resignation by' the teaoher, and said that
all teacher contraots or appointments to teach should con
tain a stipulation to the effect that no teaoher should be
appointed or reappointed who did not freely first assent
to these requirements of the board. 17

The court held:

Neither the superintendent nor any of his assistants
nor any of the teachers have any vested right in the posi
tion whioh they hold. The right to longer ocoupy these
positions terminates at the end of the period for whioh
the appointment has been made, and thereafter the right
to oontinue therein depends upon the Judgment of the su
perintendent and the board insofar as assistants and teach
ers a.re ooncerned, and of the board alone as far as the
superintendent is conoerned. It was neoessary that this
power of selection, appointment and reappointment, should
be vested somewhere, and the Legislature saw fit to vest
it in the superintendent and the board of education. The
statutes will be searched in vain to find any provision
to the effeot that the superintendent and board may only
make selections and appointments when they are able to give
reasons therefor that are satisfaoto~y to the courts, and
the records in this oase will be searched in vain for evi
denoe tending to show that any teacher has been appointed
who was not qualified for the position ~o which she was
appointed •••• It being true that neither the superintendent
nor the board is required by law to state the reasons to
anyone for the seleotions made, can the court enumerate cer
tain reasons as insufficient and then command the superin
tendent and the board of education not to omit to appoint
17Frederickv. Owen, 35 Ohio C. C. 538.
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for these stated reasons, and then punish them for a con
tempt if they fail ~o do so? ••• It is difficult to con
ceive of anything that would be more oertainly produotive
of confusion in practical applioation than the proposi
tion that the courts may state to public officers the var
ious grounds upon whioh they shall not detennine against
appointing an applicant for a position under the control
of such officers.
The oourt said such procedure would be
•••• like attempting to define politioal affiliations
which are not good grounds for refusal of public appoint
ment and punish if denying appointment on political grounds.
The court concludes with the statement of suggestive remedy
in suoh cases:
The members of the board of education are eleoted by
the people. If the people make mistakes in their selection
of men to fill their important positions. the ballot box
and not the court is the place to correct these errors.

A similar oase arises in Chicago. 18 A rule of the city
board of education prohibited any teacher from holding mem
bership in a labor union or any organization of teaohers af
filiated with a trade

unio~

or federation.of trade unions.

The role also provided that "any member of the eduoational
department who shall be found gUilty of violation of any
provisions of this rule shall be liable to dismissal from
the service or to such lesser disoiplines as the board, in
1ts discretion, in eaoh case, shall determine."

Some thirty

five hundred of the seven thousand teaohers were members
of the Chicago Teachers Federation which was affiliated
with a federation of trade unions.

The oourt laid down the

following rule:
r8people ex rel.Fursman v. City of Chicago, 278 Ill.
318.
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No person has a right to demand that he or she shall
be employed as a teaoher. The board has the absolute
right to deoline to employ or reemploy an applicant for
any reason whatever, of or for no reason at all. The board
is responsible only to the people of the city from whom,
through the mayor, the members have received their appoint
ments. It is no infringement upon the constitutional rights
of anyone for the board to decline to employ him as a teach
er in the school, and it is innnaterial whether the reason
for the refusal to employ him is because the applicant is
married or unmarried, is of fair complexion or of dark, is
or is not a member of a trade union,'or whether no reason
is given for such refusal. The board is not bound to give
any reason for its action•••• Questions of policy are sole
ly for the determination of the board and, when they have
once been deter.mined by it, the courts will not inquire in
to their propriety.
Judges Farmer and Carter, while concurring with the oonclu
sions reached in this opinion did not concur in all the
reasoning of the opinion.

They held as follows:

This power does not, however, inolude the power to
adopt any kind of an arbitrary rule for the employment of
teachers it chooses to adopt, for a rule can easily be im
agined, the adoption of which would be unreasonable, oontrary
to publio policy, and on the fact of it not calculated to
promote the best interest and welfare of the schools.
May looal boards of school contr,ol limit or prescribe
the residenoe or boarding locality of the public school
teaoher?

Will the courts hold such rules and regulations

within the discretionary power of boards?

The California

Supreme Court held that a resolution of the Board of Edu
cation of San Franoisoo, requiring teaohers and other sohool
employees to reside within the city

an~

oounty during their

employment, is a reasonable exercise of power under a San
Francisco oharter empowering the board of education to enforoe
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necessary regulations for the government and effioienoy of
the sohools .19
This partioular oase, it seems, originated out of the
desire of the plaintiff teacher to reslde with her parents
in Berkley aoross the Bay.

The court found that because of

the inability ot the steamship oompanies to maintain a re
liable sohedule, the board of eduoation was justified in en
aoting the particular resolution in order to maintain the
effioiency ot the schools.

A holding of the Supreme Court

of California that the Board of Eduoation of San Francisco
may require its teachers to reside within the city is cited
as example of the discretionary power given the sohool board.
It was pointed out that suoh regulation does not unreason
ably restrict a teacher's choice ot a residence and may well
be for the direct benefit of the school.

The oourt said:

In contemplation of the fact that the teacher stands
in 1000 parentis, that it may become her duty to devote
her time to the welfare of her pupils, even outside ot
school hours, that the hurrying for boats and trains can
not be oonducive to the highest effioiency on the part of
the teaoher, that tardiness may result from delays or ob
structions in the transportation which a non-resident teach
er must use, •••• all these, and many more oonsiderations
not necessary to detail, certainly make the resolution in
question a reasonable exercise of the power of the board
of eduoation.
In other jurisdictions, however, it has been found that
it was unreasonable for the local board to prescribe resi
denoe or boarding limitations. 20 The rule appears to be that
19stuart v. Board of Education, 116 Cal. 10.
20Home v. Sohool District, ?5 N. H. 411, 35 Ohio C. C.
538.

-
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a teaoher's residenoe or boarding plaoe may be presoribed
by the employing board when it is neoessary to obtain a
quality of servioe reasonably demanded by the board of ed
uoation.
Maya board contraot with a teacher for a term begin
ning beyond the official term of some of the contracting
board members?

The prevailing rule as gathered from the

authorities seems to be that, where there is no limit placed
o~

the exeroise of power conferred upon school trustees or

boards to oontraot with and employ teachers, a contraot by
suoh trustees or board employing a teacher for a term to com
mence or oontinue

a~ter

the expiration of the term of such

trustees or board is valid and binding upon suooessors in
offioe.

The rule may be stated as follows:

In the absence of express or implied statutory limita
tions, a school board may enter into a contract to employ
a teaoher or any proper officer for a term extending beyond
that of the board itself, and suoh contract if made in good
~aith and without oollusion, binds the succeeding board.
It has even been held that under proper circumstances a
board may contract for the services of an employee to com
menoe at a time SUbsequent to the end of the term of one
or more of their members and subsequent to the reorganiza
tion of the board as a whole, or even SUbsequent to the
term of the board as a whole. But, the hiring for an un
usual time is strong evidence of fraud and oollusion, which
if present would invalidate the oontract. 2l
Thus, it has been held that a school board may contraot
to employ a teacher for a period to commence in the future
after the expiration of the term of the board, and the fact
is immaterial that the emploYment was for the purpose of
2i~ v.- Board of Eduoation, 86 Okl. 265.
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forestalling the new board, where fraud on the part of the
board making the contraot is not alleged. 22

The courts in

variably hold that the board is a continuous body and, while
the personnel changes, the corporation continues. unchanged.
Such corporation has the power to contract, and its oon
tracts are oontraots of the board and not of the individual
members.
Gardner v. yorth

Litt~e

Rock Special School District

exemplifies the rule just stated. 23

In this oase the board

engaged a superintendent for a period of two years, and al
though a written contract was entered into, the board dis
oharged the superintendent at the end of a year. - It was
olaimed in this oase that the board could not make a valid
oontract for a two-year term.

The court held:

The proper rule seems to be that unless a statute pre
scribes a time limit upon the duration of suoh a contraot,
the board may make a contract for a reasonable length of
time, and the reasonableness of the contract is to be de
termined by all the circumstanoes. The mere fact that there
are changes in the personnel of the board during the life
of the contract does not of itself render it unreasonable
in duration of time.
Again, in a Conneoticut case, the plaintiff was hired
for a year by a school comm1 ttee of the district and ,dis- ,
charged at the end of the third quarter by a new committee,
ostensibly on the grounds that the employing committee had
no .power to bind the district beyond their term of offioe.
The court said:
22School T?wn of Milford v. Ziegler, 1 Ind. App. 138.
23Gardner v. North Little RO~~ Special School District,
161 Ark.

~66.
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It would be a novel and most mischievous dootrine that
the offioers who manage the governmental oorporations of the
state have no power to make a oontract whioh was not to be
performed within the time for whioh they were elected to of
fioe. 24
Gates v. Sohool Distriot represents one of the best oon
•

sidered oases on the authority of boards to bind their suo
oessors in office. 25

The plaintiff on May 3, 1888, was eleot

ed superintendent of schools for one year beginning July 1,
1888.

On May 10, plaintiff aooepted position.

The annual

sohool board. eleotion was held on May 19, at whioh time new
members were eleoted and failed to reoognize plaintifr as
superintendent and prooeeded to the eleotion of another su
perintendent.

In this jurisdiotion the statute provided

that:
Boards of directors _shall have power to employ superin
tendents of the schools.
The oourt pointed out that this power is granted in the
broadest of terms without plaoing any limitations or restrio
tions on its exeroise.

It was oontended in this oase, that

the seleotion of the superintendent during eaoh year should
be left to the exolusive oontrol of the partioular board for
eaoh year.

The oourt said in referenoe to this oontention:

As a matter of policy an argument might be made on eith
er side of that oontention. There is nothing in the law to
sustain the affirmative. PUblio interests might suffer from
unwise oontraots oovering an extended term in the future.
They might surfer equallY for want of power to make a oon
traot when a good opportunity offered. But with the ques
tion of policy, we have no oonoern exoept so far as an aid

24Wilson v. East Bridgeport, 36 Conn. 280.
25Gates v. Sohool Distriot, 53 Ark. 468.
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in asoertaining legislative intent •••• There is nothing
in the act that the legilature intended either more or
less than it said. We, therefore, conclude that the act
furnishes an aocurate expression of legislative intent,
and that there is no law that forbids the sohool board to
make a contract for a superintendent for a term beginning
after some members of the board go out o~ o~~i~e.
The conclusion of this case is sustained by the weight
of authority.26
It may be pointed out that teachers, unlike the mem
bers of the profession of law or medicine, in addition to
being certified to by the state, must enter into a contract
ual status in order to practice their profession.

Therefore,

it has been discovered from the investigations undertaken
in this chapter, that a teacher must secure his contract to
teach from a board of school directors who alone are auth
orized by law to enter into such contracts with teachers.
It seems to be a well settle law that in the absence of con
trolling statutory provisions, the authority of the board to
employ teachers includes the power to dismiss.

Therefore,

the courts have invariably ruled that, when a teacher was
26Cleveland v. ~~, 88 Mich. 374; Chittenden v. School
Distriot, 56 vt. 551; avis v. Board of EducatIon, 175 Mi'ch.
105; Farrell v. School District, ~6 Mioh. 4j; Hemingway v.
~oint School District, 118 Wis. 294; Renbelt v. schOOl Town,
106 Ind. 478; Splaine v.' School District, 20 Wash. 74; schOOl
District v. Morse, 62 Mass. l~l; Sparta Sohool Township v.
Mendell, 138 Ind. 188; Silver v. C~~I~S, ? Wend (N. Y.)
181; Teplan v. school Dlstrlct, 44 Mic • 500; Taylor v.
School D strict, 16 Wash. 365; Town of Pearsoll v. Wools (Tex.)
50 s. W. 95g;~Wait v. Hit, 67 N. Y. 36; Webster v. school
District, 16 W~336;
eeler v. Burke, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 168;
WIlson v. School Distriot, 36 Conn. 280; Williams v. Buch,
162 Ky. 143.
---
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dismissed or failed of reappointment, such teacher possessed
no vested rights of contract.

It has been seen, furthermore,

that courts invariably construe a wide range of discretion
ary power to boards of school directors on the ground that
boards chosen by the people are the educational-policy-for.m
ing body for the state, and not the oourts; and if boards
abuse their discretion, the electorate have their remedy
through the ballot box.

CHAPTER IV
Rro~OVAL

A1~

DISlllSSAL OF TEACHERS

Up to this ·point we have investigated the conditions
under which teachers beoome eligible to contract; are se
lected and appointed to a teaching position; and enter in
to and exeoute contracts.

In this chapter the conditions

under which a teacher may be removed, dismissed or dis
oharged will be oonsidered.

It will be necessary to in

quire into the authority and right ot school boards to re
move or dismiss, and the conditions under which the right
may be exercised, including the mode of removal or dismis
sal.
The ter.ms "removal" and "dismissal!t are otten used in
terohangeably.

Striotly, the word "removal't in referenoe

to teachers' contracts implies some personal dereliotion of
duty, while the more inclusive term "dismissal" means ter
mination of contract tor whatever cause.
In the absence of expressed statutory provisions in
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reference to the removal or dismissal of teachers there is
considerable authority that boards of education have the
implied power to dismiss for sufficient cause, which at com
mon law, would justify an employer in discharge of his
servant.

In short, the right to employ a teacher carries

with it by necessary implication the authority to dismiss
a teacher for adequate cause. l
To what extent at common law may this implied power
of dismissal be exercised?

A dictum in Loehr v. Board, of

Eduoation would indioate that this power was unlimi te,d, for
the court said in this oase:
In the absenoe of a constitutional or statutory limi
tation, boards of eduoation may exercise an unlimited dis
cretion 1n the employment and dismissal of teaohers as well
as their transfer and assignment. 2
In K11derhouse v. Brown, although there was no statu
tory authority to dismiss, yet it was held that the trustee
had power to discharge a teacher before the expiration of
his oontract at any time, even though he was properly qual
ified in all respects and performed his services in a pro
per manner •.3

On the other hand, there is found the case

whioh holds that in the absenoe of statutory authority to
dismiss, the sohool board has not the power to discharge a
teaoher for cruel treatment and profane and obusive language
- IBa~s v. state,
Mass. 28 , 39 L.R.A.
401.
2Loehr v. Board
3Kilderhouse v.

6 Neb. 167; Freeman v. Bourne, 170
510; Kilderhouse v. Brown, 17 Ab. (N.C.)

of Education, 12 Calif. App. 671.
Brown, 17 N.C. 401.
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toward pupils. 4

There is found a third oase in which the

Wisoonsin Court said:
We think the only power which the board has to dis
charge a teacher 1s the power which they may exercise on
behalf of the district when the teacher is guilty of some
breaoh of his contract - or when the teacher has lost all
right to teaoh by reason of the annulment of his certifi
cate in the way prescribed by statute. 5
This case assumes that the right to employ a teacher
oarries with it by neoessary implioation, the authority to
dismiss such teacher, still suoh authority to dismiss is
limited to just and suffioient cause and said board must
act with disoretion and judgment.

However, where the stat

ute allows the board to remove for certain specified caus
es, the board may so contract with the teacher as to gain
the right to remove for other causes 6 although some cases
are to the contrary.7
It is possible to reserve in the contract of employ
ment the right to dismiss the teacher at will or if his serv
ioes are unsatisfactory, especially if no statute specifies
the causes for which teachers may be removed.

However, suoh

right must be exeroised in good faith; and in case the jury
deemed the dismissal improper, the teacher can recover damages
4Arnold v. School Dist., 78 Mo. 226.
5Tripp v. School Dist., 50 Wis. 651.
6Sohool District v. Gautier, 13 Okla. 194, 73 Pac. 954;
Sohool Direotors v. Ewin~ton, 26 Ill. App. 379; Wallace v.
School Diat., 50 Neb. ~ 17 , 69 N. W. 772.
7Thompson v. Gibbs, 97 Tenn. 489, 37 S. W. 277, 34 L.R.A.
548; People ex. reI. Murp~ v. Maxwell, 177 N. Y. 494, 63
N. E. 1092; Tripp v. scho~ Dist. No.3, 50 Wis. 651, 7 N.W.
324.
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for a breach of contract. 8
The principal oauses justifying dismissal of a teach
er at any time regardless of contract are (1) immoral oon
duet; (2) unprofessional conduct; (3) insubordination; (4)
negligence; (5) inefficiency and incompetency.
Actual or reputed immorality of a teacher is suffic
ient cause for dismissal. 9

A

teacher may be dismissed be

fore his services begin, but the board must prove that it
is for immorality charge and not a dismissal on account of
inoompetenoy.lO
The immorality on the part of a teacher warranting his
removal does not need to be in connection with his school
work. 11

It is not necessary on acoount of it his lioense

to teaoh be revoked.

As was stated by the Chief Justice

Tindall:
The general want of reputation in the neighborhood, the
very suspioion that he has been guilty of offenses Fttated
against him in the return, the common belier of the truth
of such oharges amongst the neighbors, might ruin the well
being of the school if the master were continued in it, al
though the charge itself might be untrue and at all events
~
the proof of the facts themselves insuffioient before a jury.L"
Indictment of a school superintendent for adultery was held
suffioient grounds for dismissal although the verdict was
afterward set aside and the prosecution dismissed, since not
SHen
Sohool Twp. v. Meredith. 32 Ind. App. 607, 70 N.E.
393; Schoo Distriot v. Gautier, l3 Okla. 194, 73 Pac. g54.
9Sohool Dist.-of Ft. Smith ~. Mau~, 53 Ark. 471, 145
s.w. 669; Trustees of State Normal v. ~oper, 150 Pa. st. 78.
10Argenta Sohool Dist. v. Striokland, 152 Ark. 215, 238 SW9.
IlT1~gt et. ale v. Vaughn, 17 Ill. App. 347.
l2Ew_in v. Independent Sch. Dist., 10 Idaho 102, 77 Pac. 222.
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only "good character but good reputation" is necessary to
the greatest usefulness in his position.1 3
Obviously unprofessional conduot might be immoral but
in some instanoes might be grounds for dismissal.

Thus a

teacher's advocacy before his class of the election of a
particular candidate for public office is unprofessional
conduot warrantiD& suspension, as it introduces into the
school questions foreign to its purpose, stirs up· student
strife and disrupt,s disoipline. 14

Where a Quakeress, a

school teaoher stated that she would not uphold her oountry
in resisting invasion, that she did not want to help the

u.s.

in oarrying on war, and would not urge her pupils to

do Red Cross Work or bUy thrift stamps, it was held that
the board of superintendents dismission of her on the grounds
of unprofessional conduct would not be disturbed by the
oourt. 15
In holding that the discharge of a superintendent for
alleged insubordination and politioal activities was wrong
ful, the Supreme Court of Arkansas indulges in a discussion
of the political rights of teachers.
There is no contention that the plainti~f was lacking,
to any degree in moral charaoter, or habits, or health, or
that he was not up to a high standard of ability for the
disoharge of the duties of his office, nor that he was in
any degree inefficient. The sole contention is that he
13Freeman v. Town of Bourne, 170 Mass. 289, 39 L.R.A.
510.
l4Goldsmith v. Bd. of Education, 63 Cal. App. 141, 225
.
Pac. 783.
15McDowell v. Bd. of Ed., 172 N. Y. S. 590.
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persistently pursued policies in hostility to the views of
the members of the board, and that his overzeal in the pol
itical affairs of the district was detrimental to the school
interests and rendered him unfit to disoharge his duties.
It is shown that the plaintiff favored a somewhat am
bitious plan for the enlargement or the school properties,
for expensive buildings and grounds, and that in this pol
ioy he was supported by an even half in numbers, of the
board of directors, but was opposed by the other half. All
the witnesses who testified on this subject stated that there
was lack of harmony between the superintendent and the board,
but never any harsh feelings or offensive conduct. The most
that the evidenoe shows on this sUbjeot is that the plain
tiff adhered persistently to his views with respect to his
plans for improvement in opposition to the wishes of at
least half of the members of the board. It shows that he
was not disposed to treat the deoision of the board as fin
al, in the sense that he ceased to attempt to impress his
views upon the board but there is no evidence to show that
there was any obstructive tactics on the part of the plain
tiff, nor any overt act of insubordination. Certainly they
are not denied the right of a reasonable amount of activ
ity in all public affa1rs. 16
Dismissal for insubordination would include the case
Of the teacher, dismissed because she refused to comply with
a reasonable regulation of the board as, for instance, a
rule requiring teaohers to be vaocinated. 17

So, too, a teach

er may be discharged for refusing to receive back a pupil
whom he has suspended after his action has been overruled
by the sohool direotors. 18

Refusal to obey the rules of the

board prohibiting the reading of the Bible in the public
SOhools. 19 was held to be suffioient cause for dismissal.
Cross neglect or inattention to duty is a cause for
16Gardner v. North Little Rook sohool Distriot, 161
Ark. 466, 257 S. W. 73.
17Tyndall v. HiSh School Community, 19 Pa. Sup. Ct. 232.
18Leddy v. Bd. of Ed., 160 Ill. APP. 87; Parker v. School
pistrict, 73 Tenn. 525. ~
19Board or Ed. v. Pulse, 7 Ohio N. ·P. 58.
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dismissal for negligenoe. 20

Continued tardiness and indif

ferences to needs of ohildren were held to be good grounds
for dismissal. 21
Failure to renew a license to teach was held not to
be cause for dismissal unless provision was made for ter
mination of the contract in such event. 22

Nor was tail

ure to perfor.m janitorial duties, such as carrying fuel,
making fires, and preparing building for occupancy consid
ered negligence in perfor.mance of duty in absence of stipu
lation in teacher's contract to perform such work. 23
Incompetency in a teacher generally oonnotes teaching
inability, either from insufficient learning or incapacity
to impart learning to others, and is therefore a cause for
dismissal. 24 Lack of requisite qUalities of temper or dis
oretion in an otherwise good teacher-was held to be stat
utory cause for dismissal. 25

Failure to manage and eontrol

the sohool may constitute an inefficiency suffioient for
dismissal. 26

However, inability of a physioal training

teacher to act as football ooach in tne Rockwell v. school
20Curkett v. school Dist., 15~ Wis. 14~; Holden v.
Shrewsburg, 38 Vt. 529; Morley v. Power, 10 Lea (Tenn.) 21~;
School Directors v. Hudson, 88 Ill. 563; Smith v. Dist. Twp.
of Knox, 42 Iowa 522.
2ICarver v. Battle Creek, 113 Mich. 524.
22Sohool District v. Ozmer, 81 Ark. 194; Stimson v. Bd.
of Education, 165 N. Y. 431.
23School Dist. v. Bear, 106 Okla. 172.
24Crawfordsvil~e v. Hays, 42 Ind. 200; loreman v. sohool
Dist., 81 Ore. 587;- Holden-v. School Dist., 38 Ute 52~.
25Robinson v. School Directors, 96 Ill. App. 604.
26Eastman y. Rapids Distriot, 2 Iowa 5~0.
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District in Oregon was held as not valid ground for dis
charge of a high school athletic director. 27

In other words,

apart from immorality, the personal defeats of a teacher to
justify his removal must militate directly against his sohool
work, rather than his popularity in the oommunity.

ThUS,

chewing tobacco and spitting the juice through the screen
windows of the schoolhouse does not justify his disoharge. 28
School offioials may not remove a teacher for matters be
yond their jurisdiotion, and not relating to the school;
thUS, a school board may not fix a teacher's boarding place
and dismiss him because he refuses longer to board there. 29
In the absence of a statute or a '\Ialid contract permi t
ting it, can a female teacher in the public schools be re
moved on account of her marriage?

The courts of final jur

isdiotion have uniformly answered the question in the neg
ative.

The idea that marriage does not necessarily disqual

ify a woman for teaching has been upheld, and any other rule
is regarded as arbitrary and unreasonable. 30
A board of education may

~efuse

to employ a married

woman as a teacher, just as it may refuse to employ one who
is not a normal or university graduate.

Moreover, unless

~Rockwell v. School Dist., 109 Ore. 486.

280ttinger v. School District, 157 Ark. 82, 247 S. W.
789.
29Horne v. School District, 75 N. H. 411, 75 Atl. 431.
30Edwards, I. N., "Marriage as the Legal Cause for
Dismissal of Women Teachers lt , Elementary School Journal x:i0T
(May, 1925), 692-695.
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a statute rules otherwise, the board may employ a woman
teacher only upon condition that she will remain unmar
ried during the term; and upon her failure to observe this
condition, it may rescind her contract. 51

However, an il

legal regulation cannot become a part of a teacher's con
tract; therefore, where by statute a school board is auth
orized to remove a teacher only for "gross misconduct, in
subordination, neglect of duty, or general inef\fioiency,"
it cannot by regulation provide that the marriage of a teach
er vacates her position. 32
A strong statement of this point is found in an opin
ion of the Supreme Court of Oregon:
We prefer to proceed with the ~nquiry and determine
whether the single faat of marriage can in advance and alone
be said to be a reasonable cause for dismissal. Efficien
cy and competency of teachers and the welfare of the schools
are, of course, consummations ~devoutly to be wished". If
a teacher becomes inerficien~ or fails to perform her duty~
or does some act which of itself impairs usefulness, then
a good or reasonable cause for dismissal would exist. The
aat of marriage, however, does not, of itself furnish a
reasonable cause. That the marriage status does not neoes
sarily impair the competency of all women teachers is con
ceded by the school authorities when they employ married
women as they are even now doing to teach in the schools of
this district.
The reason advanced for the rule adopted by the board
is that after marriage a woman may devote her time and at
tention to her home rather than to her school work.

It would

be Just as reasonable to adopt a rule that if a woman Joined
51Guilford School TwJ2. v. Roberts, 28 Ind. App. 555,
52 N. E. ill.

32people ex. _reI. Murphy v. Maxwell, I?? N. Y. 494,
59 N. E. 1092.
- 
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a church, it would work an automatic dismissal on the imag
ined assumption that the church might engross her time,
thought, and attention to the detriment of the school. 33
In oases in the states of West Virginia 34 and New York,35
where the statute provides certain charges for dismissal,
the Court of Appeals held that the board of eduoation had
no authority to make suoh a by-law under the terms of their
oharter.
A

teaoher

promise not to marry is not legally binding on t,he
acoord~ng

to the great weight of authority.

A

con

tract in general restraint of marriage is void because it
is contrary to publio policy.
Courts refuse to enforce or reoognize certain classes
of acts because they are against publio policy on the ground
that they have a misohievous tendency, and are thus injur
ious to the interests of the state, apart from illegality
or 1mmoralitYi a contraot in restraint of marriage is of
this nature.5o
Where the restraint upon marriage is a mere incident
to the main object and purpose of the contraot, the courts
as a rule hold that the contract is not void in all of its
terms, but only with respect to the promise not to marry.57
33Richards v. District School Board, 78 Ore. 621, 153
Pac. 482-.
-
34Jameson v. Board of Education, 74 W.Va. 389, 81 S.E.1126.
35people ex. reI. Murphy v. Maxwell, 177 N.Y. 494, 69
N. E. 1092.
36White v. Equitable Nuptial Benefit Union, 76 Ala. 251;
Chalfant v. Payton', "91 Ind. 204; Lowe v. Doremes, 84 N.J. Law
658, 49 L.B.A. g32; ~ v. King, 63 Ohio 363, 59 N.E. Ill.
37Crowder-Jones v. Sullivan, 9 Onto L.R. 27; Fletcher v.
Osburn, 282 Ill. 142, 118 N.E. 446; ~ v. ~, 63 ohio st.
363, 59 N.E. Ill. For contrary opiniOn - Lowe v. Doremes, 84
N. J. Law 658, 87·Atl. 459.
--=
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It would seem, therefore, that a provision in a teacher's
contract restricting her right of marriage is void and

w1th~

out effect.
No court of final jurisdiction it seems, has yet passed
on the oonstitutionality of a statute specifically stipu
lating marriage as a course for dismissal of women teach
ers.

In a number of cases, however, laws have been upheld

which

aU~horized

boards to dismiss at pleasure. 38

It may be said then that the dismissal of teachers be
oause of marriage is regarded by the oourts as unreasonable.
Should a teaoher misxepresent her marriage status, her con
traot would be void because it was fraudulently obtained.
Where a teacher promises in her contract not to marry, that
provision in the oontract is without effeot because it is
contrary to pUblio polioy.
A statute may g1ve a sohool board the power to dismiss
a teacher without giving him any notice of the charges
against him or any trial thereon. 39
The statutes of most of the states, however, provide
38people v. New York Board of Education, 23 N. Y. S.
473; Jones v. Nebraska City, 1 Neb. 176; Gillan v. Board
o~ Regents, 88-'11s.1042, 24 L. R. A. 336.
39People ex. relet Everett v. Hubbell et al, 38 App.
Div. N. Y. 194, -56 N. Y. S. ;peo~le v. Board of Educ~tion,
114 N. Y. App. Div. 1, 99 N. Y. • 737, 80 N. E. 1116;
People ex rel e , Keyser v. Board of Education, 66 N. Y. S.
149; People ex rei., Gorlitz v.Board of Education, 52
N. Y. Superior ct. 520.
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mouth and tie his hands. He oomes into this oourt of ap
peal, and asks whether he may be lawfully tried, oonvioted,
and sentenoed without so muoh as notioe that he is aooused.
A good oharaoter is a neoessary part of the equipment
of a teaoher. Take this away, or blaoken it, and the doors
of professional employment are praotioally olosed against
him. Before this is·done there should be at least, a hear
ing, at whioh the acoused may show that the things alleged
are not true, or if true, are susceptible of an explanation
oonsistent with good morals and his own professional fidel
ity. We think it is plain, too plain for serious disous
sion that the aotion of the trustees was irregular and un
just to the appellant. 43
Considering the removal of a teacher without a hearing,
the Supreme Court of Tennessee has said:
It 1s a rule of oommon law, in aocord with the plainest
principles of justioe, that to warrant the removal of an of
ficial under a limited power specific charges should be made
and all witnesses in the matter be sworn. 44
Where a teaoher is entitled to notice of the reasons
for his dismissal, a letter saying that the trustees believe
it for the best interests of the school that his services
be dispensed with is not suffioient. 45
The aotion of trustees in dismissing a teaoher without
a hearing is waived by his appearing and asking for and be
ing granted a hearing, whioh results in a finding that he
is guilty of the oharges against him. 46 A trial of oharges
against a teacher by the board of directors is not objeot
ionable on the ground that they are acousers rather than
43Truste~s of state Normal Sohool v. Cooper, 150 Pa.

st. 78, 24 Atl. 348.

44Morley v. Powers at

a~.,

.
10 Lea (Tenn.)

21~,

73 Tenn.

691.

45Underwood et·al., v. Board of School Commissioners,
103 Md. 181, 63 Atl. 221.
46Kellison v. School DistI1..ct, 20 Mont. 153, 00 Pao.
421.
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judges, or beoause of their prejudice, whenever they con
stitute the only tribunal authorized to try such charges. 47
But where charges are filed against a teacher, a director
who is a personal enemy of the accused and the "prime mover"
of the charges against him, and who has announced his in
tention to join in a finding of guilty and in removing the
accused, no matter what the evidence may be, is inoompetent
by reason of his prejudice to participate in the trial of
suoh charges. 48
With regard to the right of a teacher to have the oourts
review his alleged. improper dismissal, the attitude of many
oourts is well expressed by the Supreme Court of Idaho,4~ as
follows:
After an examinatlon of the various authorities cited
by respective oounsel, as well as others, we conclude that
the general principal running through all of them is that
where the power to remove is restrioted or limited to cer
tain reasons or causes, the final determination as to wheth
er the case falls within any of these causes rests with the
oourts, and may be reviewed or inqUired into by them; and
that, on the other hand, where the power is general, unlim
ited, and unrestricted, and is once exercised, it cannot
and will not be questioned or examined into by the oourts.
Many cases 50 ooncur with the above dootrine; but it is

"
4?~Vhite v. Wohlenburyz et al., 113 Iowa 236, 84 N. W.
1026.
48State v. Board of Eduoation, 19 Wash. 8.
49Ewin v. Independent School District, 10 Idaho 102,
77 Pao.~.

50Board of Directors v. Burton, 25 Ohio st. 421; Board
of EducatIon v. Stotlar, 95 Ill. App. 250; Finch v. Fr~o~
tfifnal School DistrIct, 225 Mich. 674, 196 N. W. 532;-Feople
ex r~l. Everett v. Hubbell et al., 38 App. Div. N. Y. 194,
55 N. Y. S." 642; Smith v. Bergevin et al., 128 Wash. 488,
223 Pao. 593; 35 Cyclopedia of Law 1095.
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not believed that suoh dismissal is conclusive whenever
traud, corruption, or oppression eXists. 51 or whenever any
abuse of discretion is shown. 52

Under some statutes a teach

er who is aggrieved by the aotion of the board in removing
or dismissing him has an appeal to higher school officials,
such as a county or a state superintendent of public instruo
tion, whose decision generally is final as to questions of
fact and not sUbjeot to review by the courts;53 and if such
an appeal is not done immediately, or in a reasonable time.
the teacher's dismissal becomes final. 54
A teacher may be removed from his position for reasons
in no wise dependent upon the dismissal grounds heretofore
discussed.

These dismissals might be listed as indirect dis

missals not due to "cause".

Thus. the necessity for the

abolition of a teaohing position. the eXigency of an insuf
tioient

~uota

of pupils, lack of funds, and the transfer or

reassignment of a teaoher to another position. are often in
direot causes of a teacher's removal from a given position.
What are the teaoher's rights under suoh ciroumstanoes?
It sometimes happens that a teacher's servioes are no
longer needed beoause of a change in conduct of the schools.
51School Dist. v. Davies, 69 Kans. 162. 76 Pac. 409.
52Finch v. Fractional School Dist •• 225 Mich. 674, 196
N. W. 532; Gillan v. Board of Re~ents, 88 Wis. 7. 58 N. W.
1042; state v. Hulder, 78 Minn. t4. 81 N. W. 532.
53Jackson v. Independent School P1st. 110 Iowa 313. 81
N. W. 590; Kline v. Grannis. 48 Atl. 560; People ex rel.
MurphZ v. Board of Education. 3 N. Y. S. 177.
4Harkness v. Hutcheson. 90 Tex. 383, 38 S. W. 1120.
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Boards under statutor,r authority to reorganize or modify the
oonduct of a sohool find it necessary to abandon certain
teaching positions, thereby acoomplishing the discharge of
teaohers who otherwise would not have been dismissed for
oause.

Thus, it was held that the board of eduoation in the

City or New York not only was authorized under the statute
to establish evening schools, but also was authorized in its
disoretion to ohange the system of conducting them, and, if
the results of the Change involved the abolition of the for
mer position of principal, suoh prinoipal had no reoourse
for the retention of said position. 55
Even in tenure jurisdictions where a teacher serves dur
ing the term of good behavior, or until removed for cause,
boards under statutory authority may abolish old positions
and create new ones, perfeot oonsolidation, or economize in
the management of the sohools in the reduotion ot the teach
ing foroe. 56
Again, it has been held that a teacher might be dis
missed before the expiration of his oontraot, where the dis
trict tailed to enroll the statutory quota ot pupils. 57
Authority is divided as to whether a

~eacher

hired

for a definite term may be dismissed when the funds of the
b5Cussaok v. Board of Education, 174 N. Y. 136; O'Leary
v. Board of Eauoation, 174 N. Y. 511.
56Bates v. Board ot Education, 139 Calif. 145; Loehr
v. Board of EducatIon, 12 Ca1if.App. 671; People v. Board
of Eduoation, 99 N. Y. S. 737; Tho~pson v. Board of Eduoa
tion, 121 N. Y. S. 491.
---- 57Weatherly v. Board of Eduoation, 48 S. W. 136.
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d1;st:rict become exhausted. 58

The issue turns on the power

of the boards to exceed the debt limit or the appropriation
authorized, for the purpose of keeping open a school.
Ril~y

In

v. School bistrict it was said that in order to make

it appear that the contract with the teacher is ultra vires
on the part of the board, it must appear that not enough
revenue was "provided" to continue the school longer, and
not merely that not enough was collected and turned over to
the treasurer of the school board.

In general, it may be

said that a teacher will not be dismissed for lack of funds,
if there are any legal means by which the necessary funds
. d • 59
oan b·e ra1se

Another case of indirect dismissal has been observed
where a teacher is transferred or reassigned in such manner
as to defeot his statutory right to removal for cause only.
This becomes an important matter in a tenure jurisdiction
where teachers hold positions for life unless removed for
cause.

Thus it has been held that the removal of a teacher

may be accomplished by the transfer of a teaoher to a posi
tion involving less pay ·and rank, or by removal from a higher
to a lower grade. 50
58Collier v. Peacock, 93 Tex. 255; Harmony School Town
ship v. Mopre, 80 Ind. 275;
Y v. School Districl, 24 Mont.
219; Morie! v. Power, 10 Lea T~nn.) 219; Rudy v. dchool
District, 0 Mo. Ap~. 113; ~chool District~;-Walker~ 2
Houst. 21; Wolf v. ~chool DIstrict, 27 L.R.A. (N. s. 891.
59Ranch v. Chapman,· 15 Wash. 558, 35 L.R.A. 407,58
Am. st. Rep. 52.
50Fairchild v. Board of Education, 107 Calif. 92; Ken
~ddY v. Board of Education~ 82 Calit.483; People v. Boara-of
E ucation, 174 N.Y. 159; In Re GIese, 57 How. Prac.(N.Y.) 372.
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that a teacher shall not be discharged for oause before the
end of his term without the preferment of charges

agains~

him, due notice, and an opportunity to be heard. 40
In most of the cases dealing with the dlsmissal of teach
ers, their right independent of statute, to receive notice
of the charges against them and a hearing in reference to
the same has not been decided; but a tew cases have assert
ed that they have this right without referring to any stat
ute as giving it,41 although there is authority to the con
trary.42

ThUS, without basing its decision on a statute,

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that a principal
of a normal school, without objection, cannot be regularly
discharged by the board of trustees tor immoral oonduct with
out a hearing.

The court stated:

The appellant was summarily ejeoted from his position
about the middle of the year for which he had been regular
ly elected. When he asked ror a reason for such treatment,
he was pointed to his conviction on four distinct charges,
of immoral conduct, spread upon the minutes of the board of
trustees. When he denied the regularity of such action a
Gourt of equity was appealed to by the trustees to close this
40Benson v. Dist. Township of Silver Lake, 100 Iowa 328,
69 N. W. 419; ClarR v. Wild. Rose Dis~rict, 4? N. D. 297, 182
N. W. 307, 35 Cyc. 1093; Curttriglit v. Independent School
Dist., 111 Iowa 20, 82 N. W. 444; Ewin v. Indetendent School
District, 10 Idaho 102, 77 Pac. 22~nhabltan s of Shearmont
v. Farwell, 3 Me. 450; MoKenzie v. BoarQ of Education, I cal.
App. 4ITt, 82 Pao. 392; Morley v. Powers et al., 10 Lea (Tenn.)
219, 72 Tenn. 691.
41Brown v. Owen, 75 Miss. 319, 23 So. 35; Morle v.
Powers et al., 7~nn. 691; Field v. The Commonweal h 32
Pa. 4?8; Trustees of state Nor.mal School v. Cooper, 156 Pa.
st. 78, 24 Atl. 348.
42Ewin v. Independent School District, 10 Idaho 102, P7
Pac. 222.

t
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Suoh transfers or reassignments are held to be de facto
d1sndssals.

In the California oases, a teacher was granted

a leave of absence by the board of eduoation.

During her

absence the position was filled by another teacher.

Upon

her return she was assigned to a lower grade at a lower sal
ary.

This was held to be an unlawful removal of a teaoher

without oause.

A later California case, Loehr v. Board of

Education, appears to hold to the contrary.
The legislature certainly intended to leave suoh free
dom of action in a board of eduoation as would permit it in·
its disoretion to make such assignment or transfer as is
complained of in this case. 51
The Supreme Court of Oregon, however, has held that the
transfer of a permanently employed teacher was not equivalent
to a dismissal. 52

The transfer from a prinoipalship to an

other school as instructor was, within the disoretion of the
board, without a neoessity for notioe and hearing.
61Loehr v. Board of Eduoation, 12 Calif. App. 571.
62Alexander v. Sohool District, 84 Ore. 172.

CHAPTER V
CONTRACTUAL POWERS OF THE TEACHER

A consideration of the powers of the teacher should en
able -the teacher better to create and to protect his own in
terests thereunder.
~his

In view of the preceeding ohapters,

ohapter Will attempt to give, the privileges of the

teacher under contraot:

his right of oompensation; the re

medial prooesses acoessible to the dismissed teaoher; cer
tain types of remedies, suoh as appeal, review by the courts,
aotion for damages, and mandamus for reinstatement.
When a contract is entered into by competent authority,
it is prima facie valid, and the burden of showing it in
valid is upon the district. l As was shown in Chapter I,
~

when the oontract is to be written, as prescribed by statute,
an oral one is insufficient, and the teacher is presumed to
know of such statutes. 2

It should not be concluded, however,

lArmstron~ v. School Dist., 38 Mo. App. 169; Webster v.
School Dist., 6. Wis. 336.
2Taggart v. School Dist., 96 Or. 422, 188 Pac. 408.
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merely beoause a school board has made an oral contract

a teacher,

with

when the statute requires a written one,

that it can thereby escape liability for his servicesj for
the acceptance of part performance is a ratifioation of
the

0

ont raot. 3
A teacher who has rendered services to a distriet may

reoo~er

reasonable compensation therefor, even though he

had no contract or agreement with the board in regard there
to, for the district, "will not be permitted to avail it
self of the fruits of his labor and then refuse to pay for
it."4
If the trustees repudiate an alleged contract, exeout
ed in their private oapacity only, before the teacher has
entered upon the performanoe of his duties thereunder, the
teaoher necessarily is without remedy against the district,
beoause there is here no ratification of the contraot by the
district. 5
It is illegal to dismiss a teacher for inoompetenoy
before he has rendered servioes, where he has a proper cer
tifioate and has been employed by the board with the know
ledge of his qualifications, since he has the legal right
to begin teacher, and have his competency determined by the
servioes rendered. 6
-335 eyc. 1085.
4Smith v. Sch. Dist. #64, 89 Kans. 225, 131 Pac. 557.
5McGinn v. Willey, 6 Cal. App. 111, 91 Pac. 423.
6Argenta School D1st. v. Strickland, 152 Ark. 215, 238
S. W•. 9; Farrell v. School D1st., 93 Mioh. 43, 56 N. W. 1053.
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Where a contract for teaching states that a teaoher
has a second grade license, there is no warranty that it
will continue such.

Consequently, the fact that before

school began he took an

eX~ination

to teach, as his

li~

cense had nearly expired, wherein he received only a third
grade certificate does not justify the recision of the
teacher's contract.?
In some jurisdiction the courts hold that it is in
oumbent upon the licensed teacher to hold a certificate
covering the full term of his employment at the time of
entering upon the contract to teach. 8

The state of Wash

ington Supreme Court held:
No rule of law is· better settled than that, if a con
tract is entire, it oan be enforced only in its entirety,
and a breach as to any material part of an entire contract
is a complete discharge, and releases the other party of
his obligation to perform.
In Missouri the Appellate Court has beld that unless
the statute so stipulates, it is unneoessary that a teach
er's certifioate oover the entire period of employment, as
the teaoher may renew his certificate at its expiration. 9
The reasoning of the Missouri oases is based upon the the
ory that the statutory prohibition runs against the district
board and not against the teacher.

It was the duty or the

'Sohool Dist. v. Ozmer, 81 Ark. 194, 98 S. W. 974.
8K1mhall v. School District, 23 Wash. 520; O'Leary v.
school District, lle-Mioh. 469.
.
9Abler v. School District, 141 Mo. App. 189; 124 S. W.
564; Hibbard v. smith-,135 Mo. App. 189, 116 S. W. 48?;
School D1st-riot v. Edlnonston, 50 Mo. App. 65.

~.
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board to see that

~he

teaoher possessed the requisite evi

denoe of qualification before making salary payments.
It is, however, generally held that the failure of a
teaoher to renew a oertifioate that has expired during the
term renders the teacher ineligible to teach and to recover
for servioes rendered during the period he is without a cer
tifioate. 10

The Supreme Court of Vermont ruled to the con

trary in an early deoision, but the preoedent has not been
followed. ll
Evidently the intent of all statutes prohibiting boards
of education and school directors from employing uncertifi
cated teaohers is to proteot the people of the state against
the employment of unqualified teaohers.

If education is a

function of the state, then, plainly, one of the first dut
ies of the state in exercise of this function, would be to
prescribe eligibility requirements for its teachers and to
prohibit the employment of ineligible ones.

In suoh an

event it would then follow that unoertifioated teachers
oould not teaoh a legal sohool or reoover for servioes ren
dered on the contract, nor could such teaoher reoover dam
ages for breaoh of contraot by the employing board nor main
tain aotion in

quant~

meruit.

The Supreme Court of Miohi

gan has announced the following doctrine:
The general polioy of the school law is that schools
shall be taught by qualified teaohers, but necessities may

v.

iODevoe
School District, 77 Mich. 610; People v.
Board of Eduoation, 67 N•. Y. S. 836.
IlHolman v. Schoel District, 34 vt. 270.
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arise where this cannot be done. A district may be unable
to find a qualified teacher. Where the employment of an
unqualified teacher is a neoessity, the school district is
authorized to employ one who hes not the proper certificate,
if the school board are satisfied that the teacher is oth
erwise qualified, and to pay such teacher out of moneys be
longing to the district.12
Apparently no other case had gone to such an extreme; al
though where a teacher's certificate expired during the
term, recovery of salary for the services rendered both be
fore and after the expiration of the cartificate has been
sustained. 13

Such cases are contrary in principle to the

great weight of authority.

If it be legal to pay an unli

censed teacher for teaching part of a term, why not for all
of a term?

It is believed that the doctrine of necessity

is one of danger and uncertainty.

It disregards the doctrine

that in law a certificate is the sole test of teaching com
petency; and it opens the door to an easy evasion of the
wise policy of requiring teachers to be eligible before cer
tifioation.

It is not likely that many courts would allow

a teacher oompensation under such circumstanoes.
In Illinois it has been held that not only must a teaoh
•

er hold a valid certificate in order to teach a legal school,
but that suoh certifioate must be filed with the proper of
ficers prior to the opening of the term, and failure so to
file would justify the sohool board in refusing to examine
12S~ate ex reI. Hale v. Risley, Moderator, 69 Mich.
596, 37 N. W. 570.
13Holman v. School Trustees of Avon, 34 vt. 270; School
Dist. v. Estes, 13 Neb. 52, 13 N. W. Ie.
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and oertify the sohedule of the teaoher in error. 14
The Ohio Supreme Court has deolared oonoerning the em
ployment of a teaoher who has not a oertifioate:
The law forbids the employment of a teacher who has
not a certificate. The t eaoher is not "employed" wi thin
the meaning and intent of this provision, until he engages
in the discharge of his duties as a teaoher. The misohief
intended to be guarded against was the teaching of a sohool
by an incompetent person, and not the making of a oontraot
by an inoompetent person. 15
The legislative intent in each instanoe is what the oourts
will attempt to carry out.
There are two theories of law by whioh oourts have
found it possible under oertain ciroumstanoes to permit the
teaoher unoertificated at the time of negotiating the oon
tract to enter sUbsequently upon a valid oontraot.

One is

the ratifioation theory, and the other is the implied con
traot theory.

These theories will be oonsidered in the or

der mentioned.
Whether or not a teaoher uncertifioated at the time
of oontracting, who obtains a certificate prior to entrance
upon employment, may have the oontraot ratified depends up
on the oourt's view as to whether the original contract is
void ab initio or whether the original oontract is valid ab
initio, but voidable in case the teacher fails to seoure
the oertifioate.

The former view is held by the Colorado

14Botkins v. Osburn, 3~ Ill. 101; Casey v. Baldridge,
15 Ill. 65; SDdth v. Curry, 16 Ill. 14~.
15S chool District v. Dilman, 220 Ohio 1~4.

66
Supreme Court in School District v. Kirby,16 while the Ark
ansas Supreme Court in Lee v. Mitchell holds that a board
may not restrain a teacher from entering upon his contract
where the oertificate has been secured prior to the open
ing of the school but subsequent to the signing of the con
traot. l ?

Evidently there is oonflict of opinion on this

point due to difference of interpretation placed upon the
status of the original contract.

The weight of authority

would seam to indicate that where a statute requires a teach
er to hold a certifioate at the time of entering into a con
tract, the contract made by an uncertificated teaoher is
void and cannot thereaf'ter be ratified.

But where the sta

tutory prohibition refers to the employment rather then the
contract of employment, the subsequent acquisition of a cer
tifioate by the uncertificated teacher, before, at, or even
after his entry upon employment may amount to a ratification
of the original contraot.
The reason why a teacher uncertificated at the time of
oontracting oannot subsequently ratify said contract by the
acquisition of a certificate and entrance upon teaching,
where the statutory prohibition refers to the contract of
employment rather than the employment, is well stated in
the following excerpt from the Texas Court of Civil Appeals:
The original corttract was void, because repugnant to
the statute, and it could not have been ratified and certainly
16School District v. Kirby, 27 Colo. App. 300.
17Lee v. Mitahell, 108 Ark. 1.
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cannot be vitalized by obtaining a certificate and endeav
oring to have it read as though of date anterior to the
execution of the contract ••••,He (teacher) did not have it
when he entered into contract and that instrument being
null and void in its inception could not be vitalized and
purified by any sUbsequent events, but it is so nugatory
and ineffectual that nothing can cure it.18
When is a teacher entitled to compensation?

In general,

it may be said that a legally qualified teacher regularly
appointed and employed, having performed the agreed services
according to the terms of the contract in a substantial man
mer and in compliance with the laws of the state and the
rules and regulations of the employing board is entitled to
compensation.
A teacher having performed the agreed services stipulat

ed by the contract is entitled to compensation. 19

Having

performed his part of the contraot, he cannot legally be re
fused oompensation for failure of the board to perform its
duty toward certain children of the district,20 or beoause
the district had been consolidated ,nth other districts. 21
The teacher's claim to compensation rests ,upon the perform
ance of agreed servi.ces even thoug'h such services are to be
performed in an unusual'manner.

Thus it was held that a

teacher might divide her time between two. schools, one a col
lege and the other a public school, where both employer's con
sent and the payments are equitably distributed to eaoh. 22
I8RIChards v. Rlchardson, 168 S. W. 50.
19Brown v. White, 43 Calif. App. 363.
20State v. Blain, 36 Ohio St. 429.
21sproul v. smith, 40 N. J. L. (Vroom) 314.
22Clay v. School District, 174 N. W. 47.

68

But where the teacher voluntarily paid the rent for the
schoolhouse and purchased the necessary supplies, such
teacher is not entitled to reimbursement as it was an at
tempt to recover for services not agreed upon.

In such in

stance the court said:
The teachers in oontracting and paying these obliga
tions were volunteers. No man entirely or his own volition
can make another his debtor. The sohool board would have
been required by mandamus, at the suit of any proper party,
to furnish a place for the conduct of the school. 23

A. Similar ruling is made under like conditions in Taylor
v. School District. 24 In'this oase the court ruled that a
teaoher entering into a contract to teach was not thereby
invested with any of the statutory powers conferred upon
the board of direotors.

The extent of power conferred up

on a teacher to bind the board

Qy

an implied contract for

services other than teaching is neither greater nor less
than that of any other individual.
The

~eacher's

tlally rendered.

contract is for agreed services substan
Thus it' has been held that the refusal

of a clerk to receive from a teacher the school register
and sohedule at the completion of the term cannot defect re
oovery of compensation on the ground that the register was
not delivered according to the statute.

The tender of the

register was a substantial compliance of the agreement there
to. 25

Nor maya board withhold a teacher's wages because

23Noble v. Williams, 150 Ky. 439, 42 L. R. A.. (N. S.) 1177
24Taylor v. School District, 60 Mo. App. 372.
25Cobb v. School District, 63 Vt. 67; School Directors
v. sprague; 78 Ill. App. 390.
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she permitted some of the older pupils to "hear" classes 
it not being contrary to the rules of the board, and nec
essary, moreover, owing to the crowded oondition of the
room. 26
When a teacher is selected and employed, the contraot
is for the personal services of that teacher. The teacher
oan not fulfill the oontract by hiring a substitute•••• The
oircumstances might be such that the teacher would be War
ranted in assuming the approval thereof, or the consent
thereto by the employers without any express consent. 27
Whether such substituted service was accepted by the board
i6 a question of fact for the jury where action is brought
for recovery of campensation. 28
The teacher agrees .not only to perform acoording to
the terms of the contraot but also aooording to the reCluire
ments of the statutes whioh are either expressly or implied
ly made a part of the contract.

Nor may a teacher acting

in the capaoity of pr1noipal and performing the prinoipal's
work receive the pay fixed for a principal, not having ob
tained the required prinoipal's lioense. 29

Nor maya teaoh

er reoeive a larger stipend for rendering service in a high
er capacity without securing the proper certifioate. 50

Nor

maya teacher acting as principal, who was not appointed to
the position in the statutory manner, recei v·e the fixed salary
26Perkins v. School District, 61 Mo. App. 512.
2?SchQol Directors v. HUdson, 88 Ill. 563.
28Southern Industrial Insti~ute v. Hillier, 142 Ala. 686.
29Brown v. Board of Education, 128 N. Y. S. 16; GormJ.el
v. Board" of Education; -129 N.Y. S. 155; Stetson v. Board of
Education, 150 N. Y. S. 847.
30stre~ky v. Board of Education, 124 N. Y. S. 905; wat
~ v. Board of Education, 155 N. Y. S. 125.
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of a prinoipal. 31

Under a Kentucky statute providing that

no teacher shall teach high school sUbjeots except by writ
ten contract, it was held that common school teachers, who
taught high school subjeots by resolution or the board but
without a written contraot, could not reoover compensation
for their services. 32

Favorable as well as unfavorable re

quirements of the statutes will be read into the teacherts
contract.

Thus, a statute provided payment of regular sal

ary to pUblic school teachers in any county while in at
tendanoe upon an institute.

Such statute was held to apply

to those teachers, who, at the time of the institute, were
not yet employed to teach in the county, but were employed
within three months after the close of the institute. 53 So,
too, it was held that employed teachers attending an insti

tute during vacation before the regular opening of school
were entitled to pay for the institute work in addition to
their first month's salary.34
Litigation over the reduction of the compensation of
teachers has arisen in two important classes of cases.

First,

where the contract of the teacher has been interrupted. by
act of the board or other agency; seoond, where the inter
ruption has beeh due to the voluntary act or omission of the
teacher.

The former classification includes cases where the

3lHe-f::ITng v. Board of Education,. 104 N. Y. S. 941.
3220unty Board of E~ucation v. pUdley, 153 Ky. 426.
33B13verstock v. Board of Education, 75 Ohio st. 144.
34S ee 33.
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sohool has been closed for epidemics, unfitness of building
for ocoupancy by fire or other cause, holidays, lack of
funds, special provisions of the contract, prohibitory acts
or omissions of the board, and dismissal of the teacher.
The latter olass1fication includes absences of teacher with
out consent of the board, the resignation and abandomnent 
of con tract by the teaoher•.
There is a familiar and general rule of law which holds
that when the performance of a cont ract becomes impossi ble
on account of an act of God or of the public enemy the non
performance is exoused and no damages can be recovered there
for.

Thus there is no doubt that When one agrees to work

for another for a certain time and is prevented by his own
sickness or the sickness and death of the other he is excused
from completion and may reoover pro

r~~a.

This rule has sig

nificant application in cases where the public schools are
temporarily olosed either voluntarily by act of the board,
or upon order of the board of health in times of a community
epidemio.

Is suoh olosing of the school due to an aot of

God or not?
If it 1s an act of God, then palinly the teacher who
holds herself ready and Willing to perform is not entitled
to compensation .during the time of temporary suspension.

It

has generally been held, however, that although the epidemic
itself may be properly oalled an aot of God, still it must
appear that the observance of the oontraot by the district
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rule is stated by the Nebraska Supreme Court to be:
Whenever a contract whioh was possible and legal at the
time it was made becomes impossible by act of God or illegal
by an ordinance of the state, the obligation to perform it
is discharged.
.
. 35Board of Education v. Couch, 162 P. 485; carth~e
School Town v. G
10 Ind. App. 428; Dewel' v. sch~o Dis
trictl.. 43 Mich.
" 38 Am. Rep. 206; Holter v. School Dis
trict, 73 Pa. Sup. Ct. 14; Libby v. Innab~tants of Douglas,
!75 Mass. 128; McKay v. Barnett, 21 utah 239; 50 t. R. A.
371; Randolph v. Sanders, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 331; Smith V.
Schoo! District, 89 Kans. 225, Ann. Cases 1914 d. 139; Phelps
v. School District, 221 Ill. App. 500.
36S ee 35.
37School District v. Howard, 5 Neb. 340.

4Sg,
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follows:
We may say that when a school board makes a contract
with a teaoher for a definite time, it must pay him for
that time even though there is no teaching for him to do.
And this is true even though the contract provide that the
teaoher shall be paid only for time actually occupied in
school, for the evident intent of the parties was merely
to stop payment during vacation or absences. Vlhere a con
tract is to do acts which can be performed, nothing but
the act of God or of a public enemy or the interdiction of
the law as a direct and sole oause of the failure will se
cure performance. But, of course, the school district may
save itself from liability in such a oase by a proper pro
vision in the contraot of employment. 38
38 24 RUling Case Law, 619.
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The weight of authority holds that deductions cannot
be made from the compensation of a teacher where the school
is closed on account of the destruotion of the building by
fire or other oause rendering the building unfit for use. 39
An exception to this holding is found in a case where the

contract was made with referenoe to a particular building.40
There the law of contracts to do work in a particular build
ing was applied.

The doctrine of these cases is covered- in

the following excerpt:
The disoharge of either party to the contract would not
result ~s a matter of law because of the destruction of the
building.
A

school teacher is entitled to compensation when he

is prevented by the school authorities from performing his
part of the contract.

In case of an unauthorized closing

of school by the school directors before the end of the term,
the teaoher is entitled to compensation for full regular
term. 41
No lawful deductions :from the compensation o:f the teaoh
er can be made because of absence on reoognized holidays.42
39Bramley v. School District, 24 Mo. App. 213; Charles
ton School Township v. Hay, 74 Ind. 129; Cashen v. Scliool
District, 50 Vt. 30; Corn v. Board of Educat1on, 36 I1i. App.
446; Smith v. School DIStrict, 69 Mich. 589; School Directors
v. Crews, 23 Ill. App. ~57.
40Hall v. School District, 24 Mo. App. 213.
41NOble v. Wi 11 fams, 150 Ky. 439; Smith v. school Dis
trict, 89 Kans. 225, Ami. Cases 1914 d. 139; Tripp v. School
District, 50 Wis. 651.
42Board of Education v. State of Kansas, 7 Kans. App.
620; Hollowaz v. School District, 62 Mich. 153; school D~S
trict v. Gage, 29 Mich. 484, 33 Am. Rep. 421.
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lhe principle underlying this rule is stated by the Supreme
Court of Michigan in School District v. Ga5e.

In regard to deductions for holidays we are of the opin
ion that school management should always confol~ to those
decent usages which recognize the propriety of omitting to
hold public exercises on recognized holidays; and that it
is not lawful ~o impose the forfeiture or deductions for
such proper suspension of labor. Schools should conform to
what may fairly be expected of all institutions in civilized
communities.
So, too, it is held that a teacher is entitled to compensa
tion for a special vacation properly ordered. 43

Compensa

ti.on for compulsory attendance upon teachers' institutes has
already been noted.

Where the board of education had order

ed a two days' holiday at Thanksgiving time and the teachers
objected, if thereby they would lose their wages, it was
held that the teachers were entitled to their wages; this,
too, although, the rules of the board provided that the school
year shOuld consist of thirty-six oonsecutive weeks exclu
sive of vacation.

Vacation was interpreted to mean "an in

termission of the regular duties end exercises of an insti
tution between terms."44
Is a school teacher SUbject to deduction of compensa
tion where the school is closed by a board of directors be
cause of lack of funds?

The answer seems to depend upon

whether the lack of funds is due to the exhaustion of all
legally available funds or due merely to neglect of co11ec
43Central Board of Education v. Stephenson, 16 W. N. C.
(pa.) 124.
44Board of Education v. State, 7 Kans. App. 620.

76
tion ot funds.

To keep the school open and pay the teachers

might, in the first instance, result in an ultra vires act,
but, in the second instance, it would not be a good defense
for making void the teacher's contract.

It was held in

Morley v. Power that where a teacher contracts for compensa
tion at a monthly rate, without any fixed ter.m of employment,
and for want of funds an authorized shortening of the time
ocours, a corresponding deduction in the salary of the teach
er may be made. 45

But it has been held, that where a board

of sehool control recklessly or ignorantly exhausts appropri
ated teacher funds for other purposes before oompletion of
the teacher's contraot and then refuses payment for lack of
funds, the teacher is entitled to compensation. 46
The seoond classification includes those cases where
absence is due to

a~t

or omission of the teacher and the

resignation and the abandonment of contraet.

A school teach

er is sUbjeet to deduotion in compensation when absent from
duty without leave,4? unless there is a rule permitting
teachers to provide substitutes at their own expense!48

Ab

senoe due to act or omission of the teacher has been little
considered in adjudicated cases.

In a case arising under

the New York City Charter, a teacher was ill from'March

~o

September, and in October made an unsuccessful application
45Morley v. Power, 10 Lea (Tenn.) 219; RU~y v. Sohool
Distr1ct. 30 Mo. App. 113; Saunders v. State,
Ohio Cir.
Ct. R. 475.
46Myers v. School District, 104 Okla. 51.
47Murphy v. Board of Education, 84 N. Y. S. 580.
48District of Columbia v. Dean, 38 App. (D.C.) 182.
>



??

to the sohool board to be exoused with pay.

Referring to

the Charter the oourt said:
The salary of an employee not being an inoident to the
office, but payment for service rendered, there would cer
tainly be nothing illegal in a provision changing the con
ditions under whioh the salary is paid, so that it is pay
able only for the period for which services are actually
rendered. The sohool board therefore has the right to re
duce the Salary of a teacher by providing that he is to re
ceive no oompensation for the days on which he is absent
Without leave. 49
Maya teacher, who has voluntarily resigned or aban
doned his contract before the expiration of the term, re
cover compensation for servioes rendered up to the time of
the resignation or abandonment?

The answer to the question

will depend upon whether the attempt is to reoover in
assumpsit upon the,contract or upon a quantum meruit.

In

jurisdictions where a teacher's oontraot is held to be in
divisible or entire, notwithstanding the oompensation is
payable by the month, the teacher would recover nothing on
the oontract.

In other jurisdictions he has been permitted

to recover on a quantum meruit.
What are the remedial processes accessible to the dis
missed teaoher?

Is the order ot dismissal against a teach

er by a board of school control final or may it be reviewed
by another body such as a court or an appeal body?

Obvious

ly this answer depends upon the statues in the various
states.

In general it may be said, that where the board of

school control dismisses the teacher in accordance With the
49Murphy v. Board of Education, 84 N. Y. S. 380.
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statutory provisions, such act is conclusive on the courts,
in the absence of fraud, corruption, or oppression. 50

The

aggrieved teacher, however, may in some .jurisdictions car
ry his case to an appeal body or

o~ficer.

The exercise by a school board of statutory authority
to dismiss at pleasure being discretionary cannot be ques
tioned by the courts.

In some jurisdictions no action lies

in favor of a teacher to review a dismissal.

Nor can the

courts inquire into the wisdom of such dismissal. 51
Under the statutes in many jurisdictions a teaoher who
has been dismissed has a right to appeal to a higher board
or officer such as a county or a state superintendent. 52
SoIDe courts hold that where the right of appeal exists, such
remedy should be pursued before the teacher can maintain ac
tion for breach of contract.

Thus in Moreland v.

Wln~,

it

was said that the dismissed teacher could not enjoin the de
fendant, sucoessor, where plaintiff had failed to appeal to
county and state superintendents.

In some jurisdictions,

however, suoh a rule does not apply where the teaoher, for
50Board of Education v. Stotler, 95 Ill. App. 255; Finch

v. School District, 235 Mioh. 075 •

. 51Ewin v. school Distriot, 10 Idaho 102; Gillan v. Board
of Rege'iit"S;'" 88 Wrs. 7, 24 L.R.l~. 536; state v. Hawkins, 44
Ohio st, 98; state v. Prince, 45 Wis. 610.
.
52Burkhead v. School Distri.9t., 107 Iowa 29; Draper v.
Commissioners, 66 N• .T.L. 54; Fltz6eralcl v. school District,
5 Wash. 112; Harkness v. Hutcherson, 90 Tex. 383; Kirkpatrick
~. School District, 53 Iowa 585; Morela~d v. Wyne Tex. civ.
App. 1901; People v. HUbbell, 56 N. Y. S. 642; Park v. Inde
~ende~t, etc., 65 Iowa 209; Ridenour v. Board orwucat~
7 N. Y. S. 109; White v. Woh1enberg, 113 Iowa 236; Van Dyke
v. School District, 43 Wash. 235; Schulz v. school Distriot,
204 N. W. 281~----
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instanoe, has been wrongfully discharged without a hearing.
Suoh action of the board amounts to a nullity and the teach
er may bring action for breaoh of contract without taking
an appeal. 53 Again, an exoeption to the rule is noticed in
People v. Board of Education, where there was no present in
oumbent of the office of State Commissioner of Education.
In this oase it was held that a teacher wrongfully dismissed
might resort to the Supreme Court for relief.

The dismissal,

however, may beooroo final if the right of appeal is not tak
en promptly.54

And it is generally said that a decision of

the appeal body affirming the dismissal of a teacher 1s fin
al and is not subjeot to review by the courts. 55 In the
Maryland oase cited, the Supreme Court held that it could
not review the decision of the State Board of Education af
firming the dismissal of a teacher although the appeal pow
er was not expressly given to the State Board of Education.
In the Iowa oase oited, the court beld that an appeal to the
county superintendent of public instruction settled oonolu
sively the wrongfulness of a school teaoher's discharge al
though such appeal was determined on the ground of statutory
procedure rather than on the merits or the dismissal.

53B~khead v. School District , 107 Iowa 29; Curtri~ght
v. School District, 111 Iowa 20; Caffrey v. Court, 72 wash.

444.

54Harkness v. Hutoherson, 90 Tex. 383; Morelan~ v. Wyne,
Tex. Civ. App. 1901.
- 
55Board of sohool Commissioner~ v. Manning, 123 Md. 169;
Dr~Fer v. School Comm., 66 N.~.L. 154; Jackson v. School Dis
triot, 110 Iowa 313; Levitoh v. Board of Education, 209 N.Y.S.
271; People v. HubbelI,~ 56 N.Y.S. 642; People v. Board of Ed
uoation; 66 N.Y.S. 149; Van Dyke v. School DIst., 43 Wash.
235.
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In addition to the statutory right of appeal, the ais-

missed teacher has access under certain conditions to three
types of remedial court procedure.

The dismissed teacher

may ask the court to pass upon the wrongfulness or the dis
missal; he ,may bring action for damages upon a breach of con
traot;

o~

he may seek his reinstatement through the equity

proaesses of tbe oourt.
Where a teacher has been dismissed, it appears that in
most jurisdiotions the court will not interfere with the ex
ercise of a board's statutory discretion to dismiss such
teaoher provided it has acted within its jurisdiction and
has complied with all the statutory requirements Of dismis
sal. 56 But in an action for breach of contract, the courts
will go into the wrongfulness of the dismissal and sUbmit
to the jury the question of faat in reference to the same. 57
Where the statutes do not set out the formalities for a dis
missal procedure, there is some authority that in an inquiry
as to whether the teacher was wrongfully dismissed the courts
will go so far as to inquire into the reasonableness of the
cause of dismissal and even submit the teacher's profession
al competence to the j!ury.58
Obviously, where a teacher has been wrongfully dismissed,
such teacher has a remedy at law for a breaoh of his contraot
50peop~e v. Chicago, 278 Ill. 318.
5?Gurk~t v. Joint School District,

15g Wis. 14g; Shuck
v. Board of Eduoatton, g2 Ohio st. 55.
58Neville v. School Directors, 36 Ill. ?l; School Di
reotors v. Reddick, ?? Ill. 628.
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and, under certain conditions, is entitled to mandamus for
reinstatement to the position from which he has been wrong
fully dismissed.

As already noticed, some jurisdictions hold

that the wrongfully discharged teacher has his remedy at
law, without first taking his statutory appeals.

More usual

ly, however, teachers wrongfully dismissed seek reinstate
ment to the position from which they have been wrongfully
dismissed.
Assume that a wrongful dismissal of a teacher has been
found either by the appeal body or the court, and that the
teacher seeks the remedy of reinstatement rather than dam
ages for a breach of contract.

Under these circumstances,

if the board refuses reinstatement, the teacher has her
remedy through mandamus prooeedings provided certain condi
tions of equity jurisdiction obtain.
requisite conditions of equity?

What are these pre

It is generally said that

such teacher cannot maintain mandamus to compel reinstate
ment, whose relations to the school authority rest wholly
in contract ..

A

teacher, it is said, is not a public offi

cer and his contract is one of employment
in so far as in
,
case of wrongful dismissal, an adequate remedy at law lies
in damages for breach of the contract, and a writ of manda
mus will not be issued. 59

Nor in such case can eqUity be

invoked whether the bill is brought by the teacher herself
59state v. Smith, 49 Neb. 755; Swartwood v. Wallace,
(N. Y.) 34.

57 Hun.
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or by a taxpayer,50 the reason being, in both oases, that
the remedy at law is adequate. 5l
It is only where the teaoher by positive provisions
of law has a fixed tenure of ottice or can be removed only
for oause and in some presoribed manner, and where, conse
quently, it is the plain ministerial duty of the school
board to retain him, that mandamus can be maintained.
is the rule laid down in the case last cited.

such

Or, again,

the rule is stated that where the teacher's right rests up
on statute or other law, mandamus will lie to compel rein
statement after a wrongful dismissal has been determined. 52
Thus, where a higher authority, such as an appeal body,
reverses the dismissal order of the board of school control
and orders r~instatement, mandamus will lie. 53

Such teach

er is said to have a right other than that determined by
contract.

But where a teacher has been dismissed without

notice or hearing, and such dismissal prooedure has been
60Greer--V. Aus~t in. 40 Okla, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 336;
School District v. Carson, 9 Colo. App. 5.
6lState v. Board of Education, 18 N. M. 183; 49 L.R.A.
(N. S.) 62.
52~oYle v. SChool District, 8 Pa. Dist. 436; Fairchild
v. Boar -of Educa1;ion, 107 Calif. 92; Gilman v. Barrett,
33 Conn. 298; Kenned v. Board of Education, 82 Calif. 483;
Morley v. Power, 10ea (Tenn.) 21~; People v. Board of Edu
cation, 181 N. Y. S. 804; Pearsoll v. Wools, Tex. eiv. App.
1899; People v. Van Siclen, 43 Hun. (N. Y.) 537; state v.
Watertown, 9 Wis. 254; Whitman v. Owen, 76 Miss. 18~
5~Board of School Commissione~. Manni~, 123 Md. 159;
Thompson v. Board orEauca~ion, 57 N. J. L. 52 •
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approved by the county superintendent on appeal as provid
ed by statute, mandamus will not lie.

The teacher had no

higher right tnan his contract, as the appeal was decided
against him.

He was therefore confined to his remedy at

law. 64
The decision of courts in reference to the right of
mandamus and other equitable rights in jurisdictions, where,
under tenure codes, the teacher possesses more than a con
tract right to teach, are worthy of study.
64Taylor v. Marshall, 12 Calif. App. 549.

CHAPTER VI
GEHERAL SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The issues involved and which frequently arise and
which may be generally embraoed within the general soope
or the legal oonoept of the teacher's contract may be
briefly summarized as follows:
Ll) Issues which arise and exist between boards of
education and teaoher in cases involving:
(a) Contracts which are unenforoeable on account
of not being mutual, certain, definite, and
free from rraud or misrepresentation.
(b) Contracts in which the statutory terms and
provisions relative to the board's actions
have been disregarded in part or overlooked
entirely.
(c) In oases involving the corporate action or the
board and the lack of authority for individual
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hiring.
(g) In cases where no statute required the contract
of the teacher to be in writing.
(h) In cases where the statute required the contract
to be in writing.
( i ) In cases concerning a substantial compliance
with statutory formalities, and the failure to
express the contract in any material particu
lar.

(j) In aases revealing the vote of the board of ed
ucation not oonstituting a contract of employ
ment with the teaoher.
(2) The issues involved and wh1ch arise and exist con
cerning the contractual powers of the school board:
(a) Involving contracts between the board of edu-·.
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cation and the teacher in which the teacher
has not been duly licensed and certificated.
(b) In cases concerning the requirements by the
board of education of the qualifications of
the teacher in addition to those prescribed
by law.
(c) In cases iffiposing qualifications upon teachers,
not prescribed by law, and the nature of which
is not related to the prescribed legal quali
fications, such as:

mental tests, examinations,

residence and experience.
(d) In oases concerning the

i~position

of the board

upon the teacher limitations or qualifioations
of a more personal or local nature, such as:
sex limitations, religious qualifications, re
striction in labor affiliations.
(e) In cases concerning the validity of a contract
with a teacher for services commencing beyond
the term of office of the members of such board.
(3) In the issues dealing with the removal and dismissal,
these issues between the board of education and the teacher
have arisen in the following cases:
(a) In oases involving the dismissal of the teacher
by the board under its implied powers.
(b) In cases involving the right to dismiss the teacher

8?

at will when no statute specifies the causes
for which the teacher may be removed.
(c) In the cases involving the dismissal of the teach
er on account of immoral conduct, unprofession
al conduct, insubordination, negligence,inef
ficiency and incompetency.
(d) In cases concerning dismissal on account of mar
riage subsequent to the execution of the con
tract.
(e) In cases involving a dismissal of a te,a'cher wi th

out notice by the board pursuant, to a statute,
requiring no notice to be given.

(f) In cases involving dismissal of a teacher when
fraud, corruption or oppression have exercised
a controlling influence.
(g)

In oases concerning the dismissal of a teacher
in violation of a teacher tenure law.

(h) In cases involving the indirect dismissal of a
teacher by transfer or reassignment which defeats
the statutory rights to removal for cause only.
(4) A brief summary of the contraotual powers of the teach
er includes a consideration of the following matters:
(a) The privileges of the teacher under contract.
(b) His right of compensation.
(c) The remedial prooesses accessible to the dismissed
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teacher.
(d) The classification of his legal remedies.
A second purpose suggested as a possible outcome of
the study was to correlate and reveal some legal princi
ples which have been de·oisi ve of cases in which the is
sues involved were related to teacher contracts, and which
might serve as practical aids to those who may be confront
ed by legal questions pertaining to teacher contracts.

The

rorty-five guiding principles which follow are the result
of an organization and a classification of the essential
principles and standards discovered in the foregoing chap
ters.
Forty-five Guiding Legal Principles.
(1) The contract of employment invests the teacher

with public character and establishes a legal relation
ship between the board of eduoation and the teaoher.
(Chap. II)
(2) The teacher's contract does not differ from any
othe~

contractual relationship and may be jUdged by the

same criteria as any other contraot.

The making and exe

cution of contracts with teachers are controlled by the
rules and principles relative to simple contraots in gen
eral. (Chap. II)
(3) Contracts must be mutual in character, definite

89

based upon a valid consideration) and must be entered into
by parties of legal capacity.

There must be no misrepre

sentation (fraudulent) or the agreement may be declared
void by common law. (Chap. II)
(4) A school board's authority to oontract lies in its
unitory or corporate action; individual members have no
authority to oontract) then single action may be repudi
ated. (Chap. II)
(5) The board must oonvene as a board in order to en
ter into a valid c,ontract of employment with a teacher.
All members must have opportunity to be present. (Chap. II)
(6) The law holds that while boards may delegate to
the superintendent the power of
power to

authori~e

s~lecting

teachers) the

the appointment of teacher cannot be

delegated) suoh power having been speoif'1cal1y conferred
upon boards by statute.

The maxim delegatia potestas non

:e"otest delegari applies. (Chap. II)
(7) statutes quite generally make invalid a teaoher
contract in which a board member holds or may hold a pecu
niary interest. (Chap. II)
(8) Authority to oontract with teachers implies. power
to agree upon compensation. (Chap. II)
(9) Oral contracts valid in absence of statutory pro
visions.

No law of contracts is found which makes it in

herently necessary to place a teacher's contract in writing.
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It is true, however, that the teacher should require the
contract to be in writing, as it is more easily proven,
and furnishes the teacher with sUbstantial evidence.
(Chap. II)
(lO) There can be no recovery by the teacher upon the
oral agreeme'nt, i.f the statute requires a written one.
(Chap. II)
(11) When the teacher has been elected by the boar<J.,
it is the duty of the chairman and secretary of the board
to execute the written contraot for and in behalf of the
board. (Chap. II)
(12) Notwithstanding the rigid requirements of statute
in reference to contractual requisites already considered,
the oourts will often find a substantial compliance with
the statuto-ry formali ties and thus maintain validity of the
contract. (Chap. II)
(13) Where a statute presoribes a mode of exercising
a power, that mode must be adopted.
unenforceable- on account of

Contract may be held

inde~initeness

if contract does

not state period of employment, assignment of teaoher, or
salary to be received. (Chap. II)
(14) A mere vote of election by the board does not con
stitute a contract of employment.

(Chap. II)

(15) The application of the teacher should be written,
detailed and definite; and an acceptance of it by the board
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constitutes a contract, unobjectionable from the standpoint
of certainty. (Chap. II)
(16) A contract to be valid must be mutual, certain,
definite and free from fraud and illegality and must be
legally authorized and executed and meet all the necessary
requisites, both of the cornmon law and of the statute.
(Chap. II)
(I?) Histor1cally, local boards or committees of school
oontrol exercised the right to impose eligibility require
ments before the state t00k over such authority.

Consequent

ly, the board, still retains the right to establish eligi
bility requirements for teachers, within reasonable limits,
not in conflict with the laws of the state. (Chap. III)
(18) The appointive power delegated to the school board
is a discTetionary one, and when exercised within reason
able limits and in conformity with the statutes, such exer
cise oannot be questioned either by the courts or the tax
payers of the district. (Chap. III)
(19) Boards may exercise wide discretionary power in
the enactment of rules and regulations controlling selec
tion and appointment.

Courts will not interfere unless there

is gross abuse of the discretionary power. (Chap. III)
(20) If there is no implied or expressed statutory lim

itations, a board of school control in good faith, may bind
their successors in offioe to the appointment of a teacher
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whose term neither begins or ends within the individual
membership of the appointing board.

(Chap. III)

(21) Boards may not delegate statutory authority to

contract with teachers, but may delegate authority to con
traot with a particular teacher or in praotice ratify all
oontraots made with teachers by the superintendent of
schools. (Chap. III)
(22) The authority of a school board to employ a teach-,

er oarries with it by necessary implication the authority
to dismiss a teacher for suff1cient cause. (Chap. III)
(23) The authority to dismiss has been followed by

statutes which designate, causes of dismissal, and procedure
necessary. (Chap. III)
(24) There is considerable authority that boards of

education have the implied power to dismiss for sufficient
oause. (Chap. IV)
(25) The authority to dismiss should be limited to jUs~

and sufficient cause and the board must act with discretion
and judgment. (Chap. IV)

.

(26) It is possible to reserve in the contract of em

ployrnent the right to dismiss the teacher at will or if his
servioes are unsatisfactory, especially if no statute spec
ifies the causes for which teachers may be removed. (Chap.
IV)
(27) If the jury deems the dismissal improper, the
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teacher may reoover damages for breach of the contract.
(Chap. IV)
(28) Actual or reputed immorality is sUffioient cause
for dismissal.

Innnorali ty does not need to be in connec- ,

tion with the sohool work. (Chap. IV)
(29) Unprofessional conduct. as a teacher's advooacy
of a partioular candidate and political

acti~ities

in an

election, is oonduot warranting suspension. (Chap. IV)
(30) Refusal of the teacher to be vaccinated; re
fusal of the teaoher to receive a pupil suspended; and
the refusal to obey rules of the board was held to be sUf
fioient oause for dismissal. (Chap. IV)
(31) Incompeten,cy, lack of requisi te qualities of
temper, failure to manage and control the school, may con
stitute an inefficiency sufficient for dismissal. (Chap. IV)
(32} Marriage does not necessarily disqualify a woman
for teaching and is not just cause for dismissal.

A con

traot in general restraint of marriage is void beoause it
is contrary to public polioy.

No court of final jurisdio

tion 1t seems', has yet passed on the constitutionality of
a statute, specifioally stipulating marriage as a course
for the dismissal of women teachers. (Chap. IV)
(33) A board may have the power to dismiss a teacher
by statute, but in the absenoe of statute a teacher shall
not be disoharged for cause before the end of the term
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without the preferment of charges against him, due notice,
and an

opportun~ty

to be heard. (Chap. IV)

(34) Even though the charge be immoral conduct, the
teaoher cannot be disoharged without a hearing.

(Chap. IV)

(35) Where the power to remove 1s restricted or limit
ed to certain reasons or oauses, the final determination
as to whether the case falls within any of these causes
rests with the courts, and may be reviewed or inquired in
to by them. (Chap. IV)
(36) Where the power is general, unlimited, and Wlre
stricted, and is onoe exeroised, it cannot and will not be
questioned or examined into by the c,ourts. (Chap. IV)
(37) It is not believed that such dismissal is conclu
sive' whenever fraud, corruptiQn, or

oppress~on

eXists, or

whenever any abuse of discretion is shown. (Chap. IV)
(38) Under ordinary conditions the law holds that
where a certificate holder's oertificate expires during
the term, there can be no legal reoovery for compensation
for sexv1ce,s rendered during the time the teaoher is wi th
out the oertificate.

There is divided authority, as to

whether the teacher may be allowed to renew the certifi
oate and recover for services during the unexpired term.
(Chap. V)
(39) The law holds that anuncertificated teacher oan
not teach a legal school nor recover for services rendered
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on the contract or upon a g,uantum meruit. (Chap. V)
(40) In case the dismissed teacher is found to be

wrongfully dismissed either by the final appeal body or the
courts, the rights of such teacher may be sought either by
mandamus for reinstatement or by act10n at law for damages
in breach of the contract. (Chap. V)

(41) In general it may be said that a legally quali
fied teacher regularly appointed and employed, having per
formed in a substantial manner the agreed services accord
ing to the terms of the contract, and in compliance wi th
the laws of the state and the rules and regulations of the
employing board, is entitled to compensation. (Chap. V)
(42) The board of education is excused from oompen
sating a teacber for the period of interrupted service,
when by an act of God, or of the publiC enemy or the

inter~

diction of the law is a direct and sole cause of the inter
ruption. (Chap. V)
(43) In general the board of education is not excused
from compensating the teacher for a period of interrupted
service due to the following conditions; failure to provide
place to teach even though the building was destroyed by
fire or storm; failure to permit the teacher to teach by
shortening the school term; failure to keep sohool on ,rec
ognized holidays. (Chap. V)

(44) Authority is divided on deduction in teacher's
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salary due to closing of the school from lack of funds.
The board cannot commit ultra vires act, and the diverg
ing opinion is that the compensation may not be reduced
unless all available funds are exhausted. (Chap. V)
(45) A teacher who abandons the contract ar resigns
oannot recover compeusation for services rendered, is a
prevailing rule.

Some jurisdictio,ns allow the teacher re

covery in quantum meruit. (Chap. V)
The third purpose of this study was to be an attempt
to discover trends in the attitude of the judic1ary toward
issues pertinent to teacher contracts.

In the following

paragraphs a c,omparison will be made of the best education
al practices as suggested by expert authority and the best
educations practices as supported by the trend of court de
cisions.
(1) Education Should Be a Funotion. of the state
It has beoome a cODmlonplace, in discussions ooncern
ing educational afuainistration, to assume that education is
a function of the state, and that, therefore, members of
boards of education are, in legal sense, state officials
rather than municipal officials •••• The tendency on the part
of legis1atures is to eliminate jus t as far as possi ble
municipal civil authority from any control over school af
fairs.

This tendency is wholly desirable and it is to be

hoped that eventually this separation of munioipal from
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educational authorities can be made complete.

(Department

of Superintendence - First Yearbook, "The "Status of the Su
perintendent," pp. 155-56.)
This educational praotice has been supported by court
decisions.

This point of view is affirmed by the highest

judicial authority.
(2) The Examining or Certif lC'ating Power Should Be
separated From The Appointive Power
It is in general accordanc e with theprinc iples
of a sound civil service system that the power to examine
teachers and the power to appoint should be kept distinct.
(Nicholas Murray Butler, Columbia university, quoted in Re

-

port of Educational COlnmission, Ibid., pp. 62-63.)
The above thesis is supported by the courts.

No

tioe particularly the excerpt from the Illinois Supreme
Court in Board of

E~ucation.of

Galesburg v. Arn.old.

(3) Local Boards Should Supplement the Statutory Cer
tificate of the Teacher with Careful Selective
T'echnique
Another step in improving the conditions surround
ing the selection of teaohers is to get oertain definite
standards of oompetency formulated and adopted by the board
of eduoation.

Such standards giv·e both the board and the

superintendent a foundation to stand upon and eliminate the
most poorly prepared of the applicants.

In large school
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systems where the number of applicants and vacancies are
both large•••• a competitive professional examination is
often introduced.

(E. P. Cubberley, Public School Admin

istration, pp. 203-209.)
The policy of local boards supplementing the
statutory certificate requirements 1s encouraged by the
courts.
JUdge Collins in Stetson v. Board of

Educat~on
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N. Y. 101 says:
The provisions (local examinations) were intended to
protect and promote the efficiency and educational usefulness
of the pUblic schools •••• The present cOlnm1ssioner of educa
tion h_as well said in an opinion: "The references to the re
quirements of the state school laws contained in such provi
sions of the Education law prescribe the minimum qualifica
tions of teachers. Such references should not be construed
to restrict the power of the board of education to impose ad
ditional academic and professional qualifications as prelim
inary requirem~nts for an appointment."
(4) The Superintendent Should Select and Nominate
Teachers
This authority (nomination of teachers) ranks first
among those which the superintendent initiates.

It is sig

nificant that the head of the school system should have pow
er to initiate the appointment of teachers.

This adds

strength to his functi,ons of professional leadership and
insures, a higher degree of cooperation in the superintendent's
effort to improve instruction.

(Department of Superinten

denoe, FI:r-st Yearbook, "The status of the Superintendent,"
p. 153.)
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This suggested practice is favorably cowuented up
on by Federal J'udge Van Orsdell in United states ex rel
Denney v. Callahan.
(5) The Dismissal of a Teacher Should Be Made a Pro
fessional Rather Than a Legal, Matter
There appears to be a fundamental tendency for the
oourts to base their practice on the principle that the
state laws have set up a special organization responsible
to the public for the, oonduct of education, including the
administration of the appointment and dismissal of the
teachers.

'ithin these laws the constituted authorities

should limit their jurisdiotion, exercise their discretion,
refrain from arbitrary action, and determine from the point
of view of the interests of the public and the schools the
reasonableness of the procedure.

(Isaac L. Kandel, Teach

ers College Record, XXVI, no. 3, Nov. 1924.)
The above practice is endorsed by Justice Cuddlebeck in the oelebrated case of People ex rel Peixotto v.
Board ot Education 212 N. Y. 46.3.
The proceedings of the board of education involve
simply a matter of school discipline and are not subject to
review by mandamus •••• Sec. 1093 of The C,i ty Charter has made
neglect of duty ground for dismissal without any qualifying
words •••• The general rule is that mandamus will not lie to
review the determination that public boards of officers in
matters involving the exercise of discretion or jUdgment,
if they have preceded Within their jurisdiction and in sub
stantial compliance with the form of the lew.
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